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The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven
Activism: Avoiding Governance Pitfalls
Joel Slawotsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States shareholder-value-centric corporate governance
architecture obligates corporate management to harness the business to
maximize financial returns to the owners — the shareholders — even at the
expense of other non-shareholder interests.1 In contrast to the United
States model, the interests of shareholders are not the exclusive driver of
managerial conduct in stakeholder governance systems. Under the
stakeholder model, a variety of other interests are considered such as
employees, suppliers, environmental, social and other interests.2 The
stakeholder regime is prevalent in both the European Union3 and Asia.4
Several nations such as the U.K. and Australia — historically shareholdervalue jurisdictions — have apparently embraced an “enlightened

* Former law clerk to the Hon. Charles H. Tenney (U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y.) and AV peer-review
rated attorney at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal (now Dentons). He has taught at Radzyner Law
School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel and other law and business schools.
jslawotsky@idc.ac.il.
1. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available for shareholders).
2. See YADONG LUO, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 37 (2007) (noting the
stakeholder model emphasizes various non-shareholder interests depending upon the particular cultural
norms of that nation). For example, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund takes social responsibility
into account when making activist investment decisions such as divestment. See also ROGER
BLANPAIN ET AL., RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM SHAREHOLDER VALUE TO
STAKEHOLDER VALUE 121 (2011) (Norway has a stakeholder model of governance as opposed to a
shareholder model).
3. See LUO, supra note 2, at 41–48 (describing continental European nations as being primarily
stakeholder value driven); see also Franklin Allen et al., Stakeholder Governance, Competition and
Firm Value 1, (CESifo Group, Working Paper No. 4652, 2014) (“Germany is by no means the only
country where the interests of parties other than just shareholders have bearing on companies’ policies.
Employees are represented — directly or indirectly — in companies’ boards in several other countries
such as Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and France.”) (internal citations
omitted).
4. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 1–2 (“Similar arrangements are present in China, where firms are
explicitly required to bear in mind their social responsibilities in conducting their business operations.
In Japan social norms have similar effects in that it is widely accepted that stakeholder interests, and in
particular employee interests, play a predominant role.”) (internal citations omitted).
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shareholder value” model5 which seeks to promote other stakeholder
values, mitigating the otherwise exclusive focus on profits and shareholder
returns.6 Some political7 and business8 leaders have advocated a similar
model for the United States, referring to it as “sustainable capitalism.”9
In the United States, the supreme importance of shareholder value has
fostered a cultural encouragement of activism which has been in practice
since at least the 1930s.10 The activist strategy gained traction in the late
1970s11 and rose to prominence in the 1980s, as financial legends such as
Carl Icahn12 and T. Boone Pickens engaged in various corporate take-over

5. See Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose in a
Post-Financial World?, in DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 50–97 (Joan Loughrey ed., 2013); see also Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Corporate
Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the U.K. and the U.S., in CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 147 (Praveen Kumar & Allessandro Zattoni eds., 2006).
6. See Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take? 17(11) INT’L CO. AND COM. L.
REV. 329, 339 (2006).
7. See Joel Slawotsky, Sustainable Capitalism: Revelations from the Japanese Model, 63
HASTINGS L.J. VOIR DIRE 10 (2012) (“Critics of America’s shareholder-centric model allege that it is
archaic and a failure, and they believe that the American version of capitalism must undergo a dramatic
shift toward a stakeholder-based model emulating other nations . . . . President Obama recently echoed
the ‘sustainable capitalism’ theme by calling for major changes that would enhance the interests of
other stakeholders in order to construct an economy ‘built to last.’”).
8. See James Surowiecki, A Fair Day's Wage, NEW YORKER (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.newyork
er.com/magazine/2015/02/09/fair-days-wage (noting CEO Mark Bertolini’s comments on Aetna’s
substantial pay raise for its lowest-paid workers: “Companies are not just money-making machines. For
the good of the social order, these are the kinds of investments we [corporations] should be willing to
make.”).
9. Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 10; see also Al Gore & David Blood, A Manifesto for Sustainable
Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2011, at A21 (“Before the crisis and since, we and others have called
for a more responsible form of capitalism, what we call sustainable capitalism: a framework that seeks
to maximize long-term economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while integrating
environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics throughout the decision-making process.”);
Margaret Talev et al., Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders Clash Over Reining In Wall Street, BLOOMBERG
POLITICS (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-10-13/debate-invegas-will-hillary-clinton-give-her-competitors-an-opening (Clinton’s comments about “reigning in
capitalism”). However, shareholder value focused corporate governance has served the United States
well and should not be changed. Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 11 (pointing out that U.S. economic
performance is dramatically superior to the stakeholder value model of Japan and noting that the
stakeholder system also has corporate scandals).
10. See John Armour and Brian Cheffins, Offensive Shareholder Activism in U.S. Public
Companies, 1900–49 (U. of Cambridge Fac. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 09/2011,
2011) (“Our findings indicate that offensive shareholder activism, while not commonplace, did occur
and was considerably more prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s than in earlier decades.”).
11. Id. at 1 (“Carl Icahn, 1980s corporate raider and currently operator of Trian Partners, a major
activist hedge fund, spelled out his business philosophy in a late 1970s memo to prospective investors
in Icahn’s initial investment partnership: ‘It is our contention that sizeable profits can be earned by
taking large positions in “undervalued” stocks then attempting to control the destinies of the companies
in question by: a) trying to convince management to liquidate or sell the company to a “white knight”;
b) waging a proxy contest; c) making a tender offer and/or; selling back our position to the
company.’”).
12. Carl Icahn remains active. See Ben McLannahan, AIG Cuts Costs to Deflect Ichan Pressure,
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battles.13 Numerous corporate takeover disputes with large corporations14
spawned major litigation and substantially impacted American corporate
law.15
Shareholder activism is no longer the domain of individual rogue
entrepreneurs and “cowboy-capitalists,”16 but rather an increasingly
popular strategy employed since the 1990s in the United States that is
substantially influencing a variety of large corporations.17 In recent years,
activism’s growth has been striking.18 “Since 2006, almost one in every six
corporations in the Standard and Poor’s 1500 index has been the target of
activist campaigns.”19 Activism has become increasingly acceptable20 and
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b7981ae-81b7-11e5-a01c8650859a4767.html#axzz3qQaj2rdG (“Last week the New York-based insurer came under attack from
Carl Icahn, the activist investor, who accused management of dawdling over cost cuts and delivering
consistently subpar returns. Mr. Icahn, who has pressed for changes at companies from Apple to Hertz,
argued that AIG should immediately split into three since it was ‘too big to succeed’ in its current form,
which subjects it to heavy supervision from regulators and constraints on returning capital to
shareholders.”).
13. Barbara Kiviat, 10 Questions for Carl Icahn, TIME (Feb. 15, 2007), http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590446,00.html (“It has been a busy few weeks for Carl Icahn,
the billionaire financier who gained fame  some would say notoriety  in the 1980s by taking over
Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) and agitating for change at the likes of Texaco and RJR Nabisco.”).
14. Corporate raiders such as Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, and T. Boone Pickens gained notoriety
during their heyday in the 1980s by acquiring controlling stakes in undervalued companies, and by
aggressively using a combination of power and debt finance to force companies to break up and to
replace boards of directors. See David Benoit, Activism’s Long Road from Corporate Raiding to
Banner Year, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activisms-long-road
-from-corporate-raiding-to-banner-year-1451070910.
15. Numerous seminal judicial decisions were ultimately delivered as a result of litigation
undertaken by activist shareholders or defensive measures undertaken by corporate boards to block
activists. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (upholding
directors’ defensive measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill agreement to
thwart activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding directors’ authorization of a large share buyback funded by
new debt to thwart activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer); Revlon, Inc., 506
A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available for shareholders).
16. See Benoit, supra note 14 (“The industry has come a long way since the 1980s, when Carl
Icahn, Saul Steinberg, T. Boone Pickens and other mavericks would amass large stakes in companies
and demand a sale of the entire company. They were called ‘corporate raiders’ and ‘greenmailers’ and
were widely criticized. These days activists, while not exactly welcomed in corporate boardrooms, are
rarely treated as ill-mannered outsiders.”).
17. Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb.
1994), https://hbr.org/1994/01/institutional-investors-the-reluctant-activists (noting the nascent rise if
institutional activism in the 1990s).
18. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21642169-why-activist-investors-are-good-public-company-capitalisms-unlikely-heroes (noting
the “unprecedented” extent of activism).
19. Sharon Hannes, Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors, 16.1 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 245, 258–59 (2015).
20. Benoit, supra note 14 (“Activists were a different breed back in the late 1970s and 1980s.
They made ‘midnight raids’ on stocks, building large, often controlling, stakes. Then they pushed
companies to sell themselves to the highest bidder or to the raider himself, or to buy back their positions
at above-market prices, a practice known as greenmail.”).
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has “hardened into the default boardroom agenda.”21
A diverse array of American businesses are being affected by
activists.22 Major brand name, blue-chip companies have been the frequent
targets of activists choreographing board coups and successfully pushing
for corporate break-ups.
Since 2011, activists have helped depose the CEOs of
Procter & Gamble and Microsoft and have fought for the
breakup of Motorola, eBay and Yahoo. On January 27th,
[2016], Yahoo said it would spin off its stake in Alibaba, a
Chinese internet firm, after pressure from the activist
Starboard Value. Activists have won board seats at PepsiCo,
orchestrated a huge round of consolidation across the
pharmaceutical industry, and taken on Dow Chemicals and
DuPont.23
As the tactic has become mainstream, a rising chorus of critics have
urged a crackdown on activism. This is hardly surprising as activism
intersects with the current corporate governance debate over “shareholder
value” versus “sustainable capitalism”24 and touches upon the fiduciary
duties of directors to monitor and correct poor management. Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine argues that shareholder activism
must be more stringently regulated by tightening the time frame for
disclosing a holding of five percent of a company’s shares.25 Several U.S.
21. Dennis K. Berman, Activists Wept for There Were No More Worlds to Conquer, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 23, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023040499045795177436014
84598.
22. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Americans encounter firms that activists have
targeted when they brush their teeth (Procter & Gamble), answer their phone (Apple), log in to their
computer (Microsoft, Yahoo and eBay), dine out (Burger King and PepsiCo) and watch television
(Netflix). In December an activist fund called Trian broke new ground by winning a board seat at Bank
of New York Mellon, custodian for many of the world’s biggest banks.”).
23. See An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/
21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampant-they-will-change-ame
rican.
24. See Renée B. Adams et al., Board Members’ Values and the Shareholder-Stakeholder
Dilemma 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst.  Fin. Res. Paper Series No.204/2008, 2008) (“Few
issues in the fields of strategy and corporate governance remain as contested as the topic of
shareholders and stakeholders has been for so long.”); see also Slawotsky, supra note 7 (noting the
recent calls for transforming the United States shareholder value governance regime to one that places
stakeholders’ interest higher up); see also Benoit, supra note 14 (“The debate about whether activism is
good for U.S. companies over the long term hasn’t gone away, most recently popping up in the
presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton. She has decried ‘hit-and-run’ activists, while also saying
some activists help hold managers accountable.”).
25. Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has called for amending the ten-day
disclosure filing requirement of five-percent holders to one day. See Michael J. de la Merced, infra
note 81; see also Joel Slawotsky, Hedge Fund Activism in an Age of Global Collaboration and
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Senators have recently introduced legislation to tighten the reporting
obligation from ten days to two days.26 Others have noted that the
employment of financially engineered products such as derivatives can be
used to avoid detection, constituting an abusive tactic, and should therefore
be treated as owned shares.27 Some critics opine that hedge funds should be
prosecuted for some of their activities.28 Politicians, corporations, business
interests and scholars have joined the criticism of shareholder activism.29
In response, proponents of activism and smaller shareholders argue
that in a corporate governance model devoid of activism, managerial
misconduct and/or incompetence will often drive the operation of the
company to the detriment of the business and the shareholders. Without
activists overseeing the company, advancement of self-interest, operational
mismanagement, director failure to monitor, poor corporate governance
and other damage to the company and its shareholders would remain
unaddressed.30 Supporters also note that activists will gravitate towards
Financial Innovation, 35 REV. BANKING FIN. L. 272 (forthcoming 2016) (providing a detailed
discussion of whether 13(d) should be amended).
26. Claire Groden, These Senators Want to Reign in Activist Investors, FORTUNE (Mar. 18, 2016,
3:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/democrats-shareholder-activism/ (proposed bill to reduce the
five-percent disclosure obligation from ten to two days). See also Letter from Wachtell et al., Partners
at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 7, 2011, 8:46 PM),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (arguing that the time period should be reduced
to one day).
27. The U.S. securities laws mandate disclosure of an individual’s five-percent holding, but if a
group exists, each several holding is aggregated. Under the securities laws, if several members of a
group jointly own five percent of the shares a disclosure is required. Concerns have been expressed
with respect to funds who have formed an alliance but endeavor to avoid the trappings of group
formation thus evading the disclosure requirement. See Matt Levine, The SEC Doesn't Like It When
Hedge Funds Talk to Each Other, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 5, 2015, 4:12 PM), http:// www.
bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-05/the-sec-doesn-t-like-it-when-hedge-funds-talk-to-each-other.
28. See Steve Denning, The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015,
4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-activisthedge-funds/#65ade6c04447.
29. See, e.g., Groden, supra note 26 (“We cannot allow our economy to be hijacked by a small
group of investors who seek only to enrich themselves at the expense of workers, taxpayers and
communities,” Sen. Baldwin said in a statement. “These reforms will help ensure that no other small
towns in America will fall victim to activist hedge funds on Wall Street.”); Alexis Leondis & Miles
Weiss, U.S. Chamber Forms Coaltion to Fend Off Activist Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July
2, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-02/u-s-chamber-forms-coalition
-to-fend-off-activist-hedge-funds (“Corporations are turning to the nation’s biggest business lobby to
help fend off activist investors such as Dan Loeb and Bill Ackman. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is
forming a coalition to make sure ‘long-term value creation’ drives public companies’ decisions,
according to a letter it sent Thursday to Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White.
The group plans to weigh in on regulations that affect corporate governance, the letter said.”).
30. Katherine Rushton, Carl Icahn Attacks Companies That Protect ‘Unfit’ Chief Executives,
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/11029776/Carl-Icahnattacks-companies-that-protect-unfit-chief-executives.html (quoting Carl Icahn: “Too many companies
in this country are terribly run and there’s no system in place to hold the chief executives and boards of
these inadequately managed companies accountable . . . . Our current system of corporate governance
protects mediocre chief executives and boards that are mismanaging companies and this must be
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badly managed companies and that, without such activists, smaller
shareholders are powerless to remedy a poor management situation.31
Defenders of activism note that activists improve the operation of a
business. For example, activist hedge fund Starboard Value acquired
control of Darden and pressured the directors to improve the business and
company operating performance by actually working in the restaurants.
After Starboard Value took over the board of Darden
Restaurants Inc., the hedge fund wanted its newly minted
directors to have a feel for the business. So it put them to
work. Every board member worked a night in a restaurant,
said Starboard Chief Executive Officer Jeff Smith, who also
is Darden’s chairman. Smith said he waited on tables and
served food in the kitchen.32
Clearly, there is a good type of activism. Lacking a major activist
investor, lackluster managerial performance will likely remain.
Do the benefits of shareholder activism outweigh the risks?
Examining the issue in the context of corporate governance offers an
excellent vehicle to determine whether activism is virtuous or deleterious.
Activist detractors point out that short-termism, mass layoffs, terminated
CEOs, and financially induced mergers are harmful to “stakeholders” such
as the community, employees, or society. However, under the shareholdervalue centric model, if the share price rises and dividends distributed, the
shareholders are enriched. Pursuant to the shareholder-value model,
operating the company towards the goal of shareholder profit is proper and
activism is in sync with shareholder value. Therefore, pursuant to the
shareholder-value model, activism should be encouraged as long as
shareholders benefit, even if such gains are at the expense of other
stakeholders.
In contrast, a governance regime encompassing stakeholder value may
not encourage activism if other stakeholders of a corporation are
disadvantaged by activists. Under the stakeholder model, directors and
officers must also, to varying degrees, consider the interests of employees,
creditors, the environmental impact, and the community when making

changed.”).
31. See, e.g., April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds
and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 222–25 (arguing that activist conduct supports better
governance).
32. Craig Giammona, Olive Garden’s Hedge Fund Bosses Waited Tables to Aid Turnaround,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 1, 2015, 7:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/
olive-garden-s-hedge-fund-bosses-waited-tables-to-aid-turnaround.
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business decisions. Some governance systems, such as Japan’s, may in fact
deter shareholder activism through a governance architecture which
prevents accumulation of adequate number of shares, and a business culture
wherein loyalty and fidelity among insider-shareholder and management
trumps outside shareholder interests.33
Activism encourages superior corporate governance and productive
use of company resources. Shareholder activists have the power and assets
to correct and improve company performance. The Singapore Stock
Exchange CEO noted that activism encourages superior governance and
has called on large investors to become activists. In fact “[t]he Singapore
Exchange (SGX) has called for greater shareholder activism from
institutional investors in Singapore. It said this is because institutional
investors have the clout and resources to improve governance in the
companies they invest in.”34
As will be discussed below, Japan’s economy has lost two decades.
The difficulty of engaging in activism may in fact be a contributing cause
of Japan’s economic problems because poorly managed Japanese
corporations were allowed to escape the consequences of bad management.
The lack of vigorous activism may have perpetuated the under-performance
of Japan’s economy. Thus, shareholder activism should be encouraged as a
virtuous tool of superior corporate governance. This Article opines that
encouraging shareholder activism and therefore shareholder value,
comports with superior governance and economic performance, and thus
concludes that shareholder activism should not be discouraged or unduly
restrained. This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the historical
context and current controversy over activism in the United States. Part III
reviews the arguments set forth by detractors and supporters of activism.
Part IV examines the major corporate governance models employed. Part
V analyzes whether activism is virtuous, noting the link between a
jurisdiction that ranks low on corporate governance/economic performance
and a lack of activism.

33. The Keiretsu groups, wherein allied loyal companies own shares in each other and place
loyalty and allegiance above the interests of the outside shareholders, is a manifestation of this
governance architecture. The business culture also fosters a disdain for the outside shareholders.
34. See Linette Lim, More Shareholder Activism from Institutional Investors: SGX, CHANNEL
NEWSASIA (Nov. 24, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/singapore/more
-shareholder-activism/2289042.html (emphasis added).
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II. ACTIVIST INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES
“Corporate America and activist investors have had a war; the
activists have won.”35 Activist investing in the United States, once the
primary domain of financial entrepreneurs and renegade traders, is now a
mainstream strategic investment tactic wielded by government pensions,
private institutions, hedge and other large funds.36 Activists have enjoyed
substantial success37 and the time required prior to obtaining profitable
results is shrinking, thus further incentivizing activism.38
Shareholder activists present a wide array of demands. Examples
include:
Activist . . . campaigns against public company targets by
taking large stock positions and then publicly agitating for
changes, such as stock repurchases, extraordinary dividends,
dispositions of non-core businesses or an outright sale of the
company. There is often an implicit or explicit threat of a
proxy contest to remove some or all of the target board
members and management if their demands are not met.
Ultimately, the activist may receive one or more seats on the
target company board, either through a settlement with the
target or success at a stockholder meeting.39

35. See Carl Icahn: The Blogger, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2013), http://app.ft.com/cms/s/67fa6b883d91-11e3-9928-00144feab7de.html.
36. See, e.g., Randall Smith, Some Big Public Pension Funds Are Behaving Like Activist Investors,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/some-big-public-pension-fundsare-behaving-like-activist-investors/ (noting the growing activism practiced by established and
“flagship” institutions). Sovereign wealth funds are also investing in hedge funds. See also Sovereign
Wealth Fund Investors in Hedge Funds, PREQIN (June 2015), https://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/
hf/Preqin-HFSL-June-15-Sovereign-Wealth-Fund-Investors-in-Hedge.pdf (noting the increasing
practice of sovereign wealth fund investments in hedge funds).
37. Paula Schaap, Dow, DuPont, Yahoo  Activist Shareholders Hit a Trifecta, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS (Dec 9, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-09/dow-dupontyahoo-activist-shareholders-hit-a-trifecta (“What’s more, activists were successful about 74 percent of
the time last year in getting companies to make at least some of the changes they requested, according
to the report, compiled for an October conference hosted by Schulte Roth & Zabel, a law firm that often
works for activists.”).
38. Id. (“Activists have had a strong year generally in getting their way. Companies have settled
within 56 days on average after an activist demands board representation, compared with 67 days last
year and 74 days in 2013, data from Activist Insight show.”).
39. Mark D. Gerstein, Hushmail: Are Activist Hedge Funds Breaking Bad?, HARV. L. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/07/07/hushmail-areactivist-hedge-funds-breaking-bad/#more-64293.
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Activist investing is a popular tactic40 and activist investors have a
variety of available strategies. At times, activists take stakes with the intent
(or hope) of forcing a “white knight” to save the company by entering the
fray and making a generous offer.41 Sometimes, activists take stakes in
order to break up the company because they believe the company’s parts
are worth more than the whole.42 The “greenmail” strategy — the buying
of shares often accompanied by litigation or threats of the same — is
designed to force the management to buy the shares back from the investor
at a premium.43 “Hushmail” is the practice of the activists withdrawing
their corporate governance concerns in return for the company buying their
shares.44 At times, activists attempt to influence a corporation to issue
dividends.45
Activist investing in American equity markets is not new,46 but surged
to prominence in the 1980s.47 The activist investor of the 1980s in the
40. See, e.g., Abram Brown, Icahn Wants a Seat for Himself on Dell’s Board; Activists Unveil
Proposed Directors, FORBES (May 14, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013
/05/14/icahn-wants-a-seat-for-himself-on-dells-board-activists-unveil-proposed-directors/#73013f186
a18; Ian Sherr & David Benoit, Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:02
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579010971386703480.
41. Bryan Rich, Watsa’s Blackberry Bid May Not Be the Last One, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:03
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/09/24/billionaire-watsas-blackberry-bid-may
-not-be-the-last-one/#119a2a9316ca.
42. Mark Scott, Activist Investor Seeks Breakup of UBS, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013, 7:18 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/activist-investor-seeks-breakup-of-ubs/.
43. See Michael Parrish, Occidental Ends Lawsuits Over Cost of Buyout: Settlement: Oxy Will Pay
$3.65 Million to Shareholders Who Objected to the Price David Murdock Got for His Shares in 1984,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-21/business/fi-4044_1_david-murdock.
The practice of greenmail has been reduced due to regulations imposed to discourage it, but the line
between greenmail and hushmail is often not clear. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Return of Greenmail:
Private Rent-Seeking by Activist Shareholders, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 12, 2014),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/06/the-return-of-greenmail-privaterent-seeking-by-activist-shareholders.html (“More companies are resorting to an old tactic to get rid of
activist investors: Pay them to go away. The practice, which involves buying back shares from activist
hedge funds, has raised concerns among some investors because it bears similarities to “greenmail,” a
controversial strategy popular in the 1980s . . . . The practice differs from greenmail in two crucial
aspects. The share buybacks aren't at a premium to the market but typically at or slightly below the last
trading price. They also don't follow threats of hostile takeovers.”).
44. See Gerstein, supra note 39 (describing the phenomenon of “hush money” being paid to
activist investors who no longer want to own the company’s shares and sell the shares back to the
company at a slight premium or discount to avoid dumping the shares and incurring losses. Following
the transaction “the activist may enter into a standstill and non-disparagement agreement with the
target.”).
45. Elisabeth Behrmann & Yuriy Humber, Transocean Reaches $1.1 Billion Dividend Accord with
Icahn, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2013-11-11/transocean-reaches-accord-with-icahn-on-dividend-plan-and-board.
46. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75–82 (2011) (highlighting the rise of hedge fund shareholder
activism over the last thirty years).
47. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1274–81 (2008) (discussing the historical transition of influence on corporate activities from
a company’s management to its shareholders, particularly through the advent of activist hedge funds).

530

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:3

American markets was likely a sole investor or a financial entrepreneur48
whose stated goal was to shake up a corporation and unlock shareholder
value.49 In fact,
[p]rivate financiers were the archetype activist investors in
the 1980s and 1990s, and large institutions did not generally
participate in activist investing (although the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) did commence
using socially responsible investing benchmarks in the 1970s
and 1980s).50
Activist investing has enjoyed a robust resurgence in recent years51
and has become a respected and accepted investment strategy.52
Significantly, while once considered “aggressive,”53 the tactic has become
respectable with “mainstream” institutional funds and hedge funds together
wielding immense financial firepower.54 “Funds managed by activists
48. See An Investor Calls, supra note 23 (“The old guard includes Carl Icahn, an outrageous and
outrageously successful septuagenarian, who has been on the warpath since the 1980s. Nelson Peltz has
similarly deep roots, but rather more gravitas. Over the years he has attacked Cadbury, Pepsi and
Kraft.”).
49. See An Investor Calls, supra note 23 (“In the 1980s activists were called corporate raiders and
were the jackals of capitalism, outcasts that attacked and dismembered weak companies to widespread
opprobrium but consoling profit. They were immortalised in the film Wall Street, whose charismatic
criminal, Gordon Gekko, showed his mettle by treating greed as good and lunch as for wimps. They
faded from prominence after a series of scandals and the collapse of the junk-bond market in the late
1980s.”).
50. See ESG Report, Towards Sustainable Investment: Taking Responsibility (2012), https://www.
calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/esg-report-2012.pdf (describing CalPERS’ efforts at sustainable
investing including climate change, environmental and labor); see generally Why TIAA–CREF?, TIAA,
https://www.tiaa.org/public/sri-funds-why-tiaa-cref-for-responsible-investing (last visited Mar. 3, 2016)
(providing a timeline of TIAA-CREF’s history of responsible investing).
51. See also Benoit, supra note 14 (“Several factors contributed to this shift, according to
corporate executives, activists, bankers and lawyers. The financial crisis fanned dissatisfaction with
corporate executives and brought low interest rates that helped activists thrive. Activists got more
sophisticated about analyzing target companies and built alliances with other big shareholders,
including mutual funds. And broad shifts in corporate governance gave more power to all shareholders,
including activists.”).
52. David Bogoslaw, Icahn’s New Megaphone for Shareholder Activism, CORP. SECRETARY (Oct.
25, 2013), http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/proxy-voting-shareholder-actions/12567/icahnsnew-megaphone-shareholder-activism/ (describing the increasing popularity of shareholder activism).
53. Benoit, supra note 14 (“After decades of being treated as boorish gate-crashers, activist
investors are infiltrating the boardrooms of large companies like never before.”).
54. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Another is that today’s activists belie the
scavenging stereotype of the 1980s. They often seek to improve firms’ boards rather than strip
companies of assets. They work with other shareholders, frequently winning the support of big moneymanagers such as Capital Group and Fidelity. They are raising longer-term capital and so stretching
their investment horizons. ValueAct, based in San Francisco, locks in its investors for three to four
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climbed to $129.7 billion as of mid-2015, almost doubling from the $65.5
billion they had to play with in 2012, data from HFR show.”55 It has been
noted that:
Activist investors like Carl C. Icahn, Daniel S. Loeb and
William A. Ackman are getting deep pocketed imitators.
Some of the biggest public pension funds, which have
sought to influence companies for years, are now starting to
emulate these investors by engaging with, and sometimes
seeking to oust, directors of companies whose stock they
own.56
Moreover, this mainstream institutional activism has shifted from the
socially responsible context of CalPERS and TIAA-CREF to a more profitcentric model.
The new activists have dramatically upped the pressure on
corporate executives and boards. Nearly every business day
they target another company . . . Their game is simple: They
buy stocks they view as undervalued and pressure
management to do things they believe will raise the value,
such as giving more cash back to shareholders or shedding
divisions that they think are driving down the stock price.
With increasing frequency they get deeply involved in
governance — demanding board seats, replacing CEOs, and
advocating specific business strategies.57
Part of the explosive growth in activism is due to the substantial
success of, and the immense profits available from, activism.58 “Activist
hedge funds have outperformed their non-activist peers and market indices,
generating a 19.4% compound annual growth rate since 2009, as compared
to 7.5% for all hedge funds and 12.3% for S&P 500 companies.”59 Marcel
Kahan and Edward Rock argue:

years and has served on the boards of 37 firms, including Microsoft. Mr Ackman has raised a pile of
‘permanent capital.’”).
55. Schaap, supra note 37.
56. Smith, supra note 36.
57. Bill George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. REV. (May
2014), http://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors/ar/1.
58. Klein & Zur, supra note 31 (estimating that approximately seventy percent of the time activists
were successful in obtaining a board seat).
59. Hannes, supra note 19, at 259.
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It is uncontested that activism has played a crucial role in
shaping corporate governance. Recently, hedge funds have
pressured McDonald’s to spin off major assets in an IPO;
asked Time Warner to change its business strategy;
threatened or commenced proxy contests at H.J. Heinz,
Massey Energy, KT&G, info USA, Sitel, and GenCorp;
made a bid to acquire Houston Exploration; pushed for a
merger between Euronext and Deutsche Börse; pushed for
“changes in management and strategy” at Nabi
Biopharmaceuticals; opposed acquisitions by Novartis of the
remaining 58% stake in Chiron, by Sears Holdings of the
46% minority interest in Sears Canada, by Micron of Lexar
Media, and by a group of private equity firms of VNU;
threatened litigation against Delphi; and pushed for litigation
against Calpine that led to the ouster of its top two
executives.60
Since activists often target the large influential corporations, activists
have significant power.
In the space of twenty-four hours, DuPont Co. and Dow
Chemical Co. — two symbols of U.S. industrial might —
and Yahoo! Inc. — a star of the early Internet age — each
set in motion a change in course after coming under pressure
from activists. The events were the latest and most dramatic
evidence of the increasing power of these shareholders to
influence managements of storied American corporations.61
As activism’s influence on corporate America has become evident, the
resulting controversy has increased. Moreover, many activists are brash
and aggressive in their pursuit of corporate change contributing to the
passionate discourse.62 The next section discusses the debate over
activism.

60. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2007).
61. Schaap, supra note 37 (emphasis added).
62. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Their rowdiness seems calculated to distract
managers, good or bad. One prominent activist, Carl Icahn, likes to call chief executives ‘morons’ and
tease them on Twitter. Another, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square, has compared Herbalife, a firm he
says is a fraud, to the Nazis. When Dan Loeb went for Sotheby’s, its then chairman branded him a
‘scumbag.’ Some have used dubious tactics, including building positions by stealth with derivatives.”).
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III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER ACTIVISM
A. OPPONENTS OF ACTIVISM
There are differing viewpoints with respect to the questions raised by
shareholder activism. Detractors claim activism is damaging and should be
curtailed arguing that the obsession with short term profits is a negative for
companies63 and that activists exploit weakness for their personal
enrichment.64 Moreover, the targets of activists often claim that company
directors are distracted by the activism and are obligated to defend their
companies and forced to spend large sums of money and time defending
the corporate bastion.65 As one commentator noted, once a fund declares it
owns a sizeable stake in a company, the directors and senior management
are busy with the threat as opposed to running a profitable business. “It
wreaks havoc. Now you have to manage a lot of other components that
you didn’t before, and it’s all-consuming — none of which adds real
value.”66
BlackRock67 CEO Larry Fink has come out against activism stating
that ‘“[i]t is critical, however, to understand that corporate leaders’ duty of
care and loyalty is not to every investor or trader who owns their
companies’ shares at any moment in time, but to the company and its longterm owners,’” in addition to the fact that “they tend to first come up with
ideas to enhance the value of an investment in the company, then buy
shares with the objective of getting their ideas implemented.”68
63. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton's War on Hedge Fund Activists, AM. LAW. (Mar. 30,
2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202721058301/Marty-Liptons-War-on-Hedge-Fund-Activ
ists?slreturn=20150330052138.
64. See Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“A disgrace, say some; the cult of short-term
shareholder value gone mad. Activists have a reputation for stripping cash and assets and loading firms
with debt.”).
65. This claim of needing to defend against a change of control is the topic of seminal rulings by
the Delaware Supreme Court which uses “an enhanced scrutiny” test in evaluating measures taken to
thwart activists. The test seeks to balance the potential that directors and management seek to entrench
themselves rather than “lose out” to an activist with the need to allow shareholders to reap profits. See,
e.g., Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 946.
66. Danielle Beurteaux, The Return of the Puppet Masters, ABSOLUTE RETURN + ALPHA (Dec. 9,
2010), http://www.absolutereturn-alpha.com/Article/2728117/Search/The-return-of-the-puppet-masters.
html?Keywords=puppet+masters.
67. The world’s largest single asset manager with nearly $5 trillion. BLACKROCK, http://www.
blackrock.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). However, even BlackRock has taken an incipient step
towards becoming activist. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, An Activism-Shy BlackRock Throws a
Surprise Punch , N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook
/an-activism-shy-blackrock-throws-a-surprise-punch.html?_r=0 (“BlackRock, the enormous American
asset manager with over $4.6 trillion of assets under management, has waged its first significant activist
campaign around the G-Resources Group, a Hong Kong company that owned a gold mine. It may be
Hong Kong, and it may be only one campaign, but companies should be fearful.”).
68. Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: BlackRock Letter Delivers Subtle Warning to Corporate
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To activist opponents, activism focuses solely on or excessively on
short term results and is thus damaging to the economy of the United States
and its equity markets.69 Referring to activists as “disastrous” and
“vultures,” critics allege that activists destroy shareholder value, are bad for
America, and are engaged in essentially illegal activity enabled by prior
regulatory laxity and error.70
Opponents of activist funds point to a growing body of studies
suggesting that the benefits of activism may be exaggerated.71 Indeed,
commentators point to several negative influences of activism.
Although financial activism may return immediate wealth to
some shareholders through the sale of assets, payment of
special dividends or share buybacks, evidence is mounting
that this may be at the expense of the longer term corporate
and societal interests. For example, a July 2014 paper by
Yuan Allaire and Francois Dauphin, “Activist” Hedge
Funds: Creators of Lasting Wealth? (available

Managers, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Apr. 17, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/ 2015/
04/17/dealpolitik-blackrock-letter-delivers-subtle-warning-to-corporate-managers/?mod=MarketsMain.
69. See Robert Lenzner, The Hedge Fund Activists are Not the Flavor of the Month for the Chief
Justice of the Delaware Court, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robert
lenzner/2014/03/30/activist-hedge-fund-corporate-meddlers-take-it-in-the-chops-from-the-high-andmighty/#250095db13e8 (noting how the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court criticizes hedge
fund activists and “questions why the directors and managers of large public corporations ‘must follow
the immediate whim of a momentary majority of shareholders’ tempted by the activists into some shortterm adventure that could push the stock up.”).
70. See Denning, supra note 28 (“Activist Hedge Funds Are Vultures, Not Saviors . . . . Thus
activist hedge funds ferociously pursue ‘the dumbest idea in the world,’ namely, maximizing
shareholder value as reflected in the current stock price. Their activities lead to all disastrous
consequences of that noxious theory. Ironically, pursuit of shareholder value as reflected in the current
stock price actually destroys real shareholder value . . . . [T]he regulatory ‘safe harbor’ of 1982 that
protects firms and activist hedge funds from prosecution for massive share buybacks amounting to
stock price manipulation should be removed.”).
71. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge
Funds, HARV. L. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/ (referencing an
empirical study conducted by Dr. Yvan Allaire, which concluded:
 Hedge fund activists are not really that great at finance or strategy or operations, as
some seem to believe (and as they relentlessly promote);
 Their recipes are shop-worn and predictable, and (almost) never include any growth
initiatives;
 Their success mostly comes from the sale of the targeted firm (or from “spin-offs”);
their performance otherwise barely matches the performance of the S&P 500 and
that of a random sample of firms;
 The strong support they receive from institutional investors is rather surprising and
quite unfortunate;
The form of “good” governance imposed on companies since Sarbanes-Oxley as well as the “soft”
activism of institutional funds have proved a boon for the activist funds.).
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atwww.igopp.org), concludes that “the most generous
conclusion one may reach” is that activist funds “create
some short-term wealth for some shareholders” because
investors tend to jump into the stock of targeted companies
upon the announcement of activist activity. “In a minority of
cases, activist hedge funds may bring some lasting value for
shareholders but largely at the expense of workers and bond
holders; thus the impact of activist hedge funds appears to
take the form of wealth transfer rather than wealth creation.”
The research further notes that hedge funds tend to be
focused on the short term, with half of interventions not
lasting nine months. In addition, a growing number of
commentators, including senior representatives of some
institutional investors, have expressed concern about the
impact of hedge fund activism, and associated increased debt
and cuts in capital spending, on long-term corporate health,
innovation, job creation and GDP growth.72
Martin Lipton has been vociferous in his critique of activists73 and
blames activism for a variety of problems:
Much of what is wrong with America today — slow
growth, widespread corporate scandals, inadequate
investment in long-term projects, low wages that have not
kept pace with inflation, wide swings in the economy
accompanied by uncertain employment and rising
inequality — is attributable to short-termism and attacks,
and threats of attacks, by activist hedge funds.74
Lipton built his legal practice on defending companies from
takeovers75 and has drawn strong support from scholars who believe that
activist funds do in fact cause damage.
Scholars ranging from Columbia Law School’s John Coffee
Jr. to Yvan Allaire of the Institute for Governance of Private
72. See Holly J. Gregory, The State of Corporate Governance for 2015, HARV. L. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/30/the-state-ofcorporate-governance-for-2015/.
73. See Goldhaber, supra note 63.
74. See Benoit, supra note 14.
75. Id. But see Andrew Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 268 (2015)
(“Contemporary notions of good governance have led almost all existing public companies to shed
takeover defenses.”).
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and Public Organizations find the data ambiguous and
methodologically flawed. Both attribute any gains by
shareholders to a combination of fleeting takeover premiums
and wealth transfers from employees (as the result of layoffs
or wage cuts) or bondholders (as the result of downgrades or
bankruptcies).
In other words, Ackman and some
shareholders are getting rich on the back of workers and
pensioners.76
According to detractors of activist investing, “the power of the activist
hedge funds is enhanced by their frequent success in proxy fights and
election contests when companies resist the short-term steps the hedge fund
is advocating.”77 Opponents also cite to studies that allege long-term value
is hurt by activists.
The ability of shareholders, especially activist hedge funds,
to determine changes in corporate policies or firm control in
the short-term complicates both managerial-decision making
and the extent to which other stakeholders want to invest in
their relationship with the firm. . . . In both cases, the result
is a reduction in long-term firm value. By enhancing
shareholders’ ability to pressure directors and managers,
hedge fund activism could thus exacerbate the shareholders’
limited commitment problem rather than acting as a
beneficial corrective to managerial moral hazard.78
These studies conclude that activist benefits are outweighed by
negative consequences and while activism addresses legitimate governance
issues, other alternatives might work better. In fact the studies
. . . have significant implications for the current corporate
governance debate, as they challenge the desirability of an
indiscriminate expansion of shareholder rights. While we
recognize that managerial moral hazard or having entrenched
managers and directors are concrete risks in corporate
governance, our research suggests that facilitating the

76. Benoit, supra note 14.
77. Martin Lipton, Current Thoughts About Activism, HARV. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/09/current-thoughtsabout-activism/#more-50945.
78. See Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value, 4 (Nov 19,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231.
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interventions of activist hedge funds might be an undesirable
solution to address these risks. Indeed, once one takes into
account the full range of informational problems faced by
shareholders — including both managerial moral hazard (or
entrenchment) and the shareholder limited commitment
problem — hedge fund activism may carry costs that seem
to outweigh its potential benefits. This also suggests that a
desirable direction for future empirical research would be to
investigate whether alternative corporate governance
solutions exists that may better address the trade-offs posed
by the multiple informational problems that imbue the
shareholder-manager relationship.79
Activist opponents also note that “[a]ctivist hedge funds have recently
exploited loopholes in existing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) rules under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to
accumulate significant, control-influencing stakes in public companies
rapidly without timely notice to the market.”80 The Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, has also weighed in with a similar
cautionary view of activists arguing that there is a vital need for more
timely and comprehensive information regarding activist investments
particularly when the activists seek to alter business strategies. Echoing
Lipton’s time delay criticisms, Justice Strine agrees with Lipton and has
noted that he believes the delay in immediately reporting the five percent
holding is problematic stating that Section 13(d) will need to be amended
in response to “current technological and market developments.”81 Justice
Strine has recently been joined by several U.S. Senators also advocating for
a more stringent disclosure requirement.82
79. Cremers et. al., supra note 78. See also Bill George, Dow-DuPont Raises Even More
Concerns America Is Abandoning Corporate Research, FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2015, 1:47 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/12/12/dow-dupont-corporate-research-america/ (“In the struggle between
research to fuel growth and cutbacks for short-term gains, financial engineers have the upper hand
today. While these financial machinations are pleasing short-term traders, the loser will be America’s
superior research machine. As a consequence, the U.S. could lose its global edge in research and badly
damage its innovative spirit.”).
80. Lipton, supra note 77.
81. Michael J. de la Merced, S.E.C. Chief Sees Virtue in Activist Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/business/dealbook/sec-chief-sees-virtue-in-activist-investor
s.html (“No less than Leo E. Strine Jr., the chief justice of Delaware’s Supreme Court  wearing a
jaunty trilby hat at the conference this year  argued on a panel in favor of a more sensitive tripwire
that involved disclosure within 24 hours.”). For a discussion of hedge funds and 13(d) disclosure, see
Slawotsky, supra note 25.
82. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 496 (2014) (arguing that
holders should “update[e] their filing within twenty-four to forty-eight hours if their ownership interest
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B. SUPPORTERS OF ACTIVISM
Proponents of activist investing disagree with the above-cited
criticisms and argue that companies are positively influenced by
shareholder activism.
Because institutional investors ultimately decide whether an
activist’s campaign will succeed, activism potentiates
institutional voice by putting choices to the institutions . . .
So in sidelining activist investors, the United Kingdom and
the European Union are also sidelining the institutions —
just those whose roles are simultaneously sought to be
expanded into stewardship.83
Lucian Bebchuk has written extensively about his research indicating
that hedge fund activism is beneficial, with no accompanying evidence that
activist funds bring adverse consequences either to their companies or to
the economy.84
Activism has in fact been extolled as highly beneficial, serving as a
counter-balance to managerial entrenchment. Carl Icahn argues as follows:
True corporate democracy does not exist in America and as a
result many unfit chief executives are not held accountable.
Poison pills and other board tricks disenfranchise
stockholders. As a result entrenched chief executives and
boards of directors may be protected even if they are
ineffective.85
Activists point to examples when activism positively exerted influence
the company and rescued the shareholders from ineffective management.
“One example . . . is railroad Canadian Pacific Railway, which languished
for years under an inattentive management team base of investors. Only
after Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman got involved, were necessary
operational and managerial changes made, to the benefit of long-term

changes by one percent in any direction, long or short.”); Groden, supra note 26 (proposed bill to
reduce the five percent disclosure obligation from ten to two days). See also Letter from Wachtell et
al., supra note 26 (arguing that the time period should be reduced to one day).
83. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 906 (2013).
84. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1085 (2015).
85. Rushton, supra note 30 (quoting Carl Icahn).
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holders.”86
Studies have indicated that activism does in fact support enhanced
corporate functioning. The results of these studies,
. . . suggest that hedge fund activism during the periods
studied generated significantly higher abnormal stock returns
during the window surrounding the announcement of
activism than a control sample of passive block holders.
This evidence further suggests that hedge fund activists
achieved measurable success, at least in terms of traditional
metrics of financial performance such as Tobin’s Q and
stock price changes, and that these gains were not reversed
over the longer term. Indeed, Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang
(2013) finds that hedge fund activism through 2007 was
followed by improved operating performance during the five
years after intervention.87
Moreover, activists help level the playing field with respect to
management agency conflicts. By leveraging the smaller holders to a
powerful activist, the minority shareholders are empowered.88 There is
support for the notion that activists have improved the financial outcomes
of smaller holders and have indeed enhanced overall shareholder value.
As shareholders of target companies, hedge funds have
actively opposed several proposed acquisitions and have
often succeeded in improving the terms of the transaction. A
recent example involved Novartis’s attempt to acquire the
58% of Chiron that it did not already own. Novartis initially
offered $40 per share to the Chiron shareholders. An
independent committee of Chiron negotiated this price up to
$45 per share, a 23% premium over Chiron’s pre-offer share
price. One month after the agreement was announced,
ValueAct Capital, a hedge fund and the third largest
shareholder of Chiron, sent a “stinging” letter to Chiron’s
86. Antoine Gara, Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t the Reason Capitalism is Coming Up Short,
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/04/17/activist-hedgefunds-arent-the-reason-capitalism-is-coming-up-short/.
87. C.N.V Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of
Reputation, Clout, and Expertise (Dec. 8, 2015) (Vanderbuilt Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 15-9),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589992.
88. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1922 (2013) (arguing that activists have empowered themselves and other shareholders and the
management agency problem has been substantially reduced).
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CEO announcing its opposition. This started a shareholder
revolt, with mutual fund Legg Mason, the second largest
shareholder of Chiron, joining ValueAct’s opposition, and
Institutional Shareholder Services recommending a vote
against the deal. To get the transaction through, Novartis
had to raise its offer to $48 a share, increasing the premium
from 23% to 32%.89
While activist opponents, such as Lipton, are big believers in
corporate takeover defense, some have found that takeover defenses are
positively correlated to companies with lower shareholder value.90 The fact
that poison pills exist, it is argued, makes activism an important
counterbalance to the power of management to deter legitimate change.91
Significantly, activists are often supported by mainstream institutional
holders. “The hedge funds have done a marvelous job. No matter how we
feel about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to
achieve our aims. We were right behind (the hedge funds), but we couldn’t
have done it without them.”92 Accordingly, activists act as potential
leaders emboldening smaller and otherwise passive shareholders to more
effectively monitor, and if needed, correct corporate mismanagement. The
next section will discuss the debate in the context of the global corporate
governance divide.
IV. THE ISSUE OF ACTIVISM IN THE GLOBAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CONTEXT
Corporate governance is acknowledged as a vital factor in creating
superior economic performance93 and nations are endeavoring to improve
governance.
89. Kahan & Rock, supra note 60, at 1037.
90. Although there is no evidence of causation, the correlation should be noted. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A.
Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and The Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence From Two Natural
Experiments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17127, 2011), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17127.pdf (finding that staggered boards lead to lower firm value). See also Lucian Bebchuk at
al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (staggered boards and
poison pills linked to lower firm value).
91. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“One reason is that plenty of companies suffer
from rotten management. About a tenth of big American firms, and even more smaller ones, still
employ tactics like ‘poison pills’ and staggered boards that shelter incompetent managers.”).
92. Louise Armistead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 13,
2005), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/article103547.ece.
93. See Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run
Growth ( The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4469, Jan. 2008), https://openknowledge
.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6443/wps4469.pdf?sequence=1.
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Around the world, the corporate governance landscape is
shifting, as efforts to improve business practices and policies
gain support and momentum. The wave of reform has
become visible everywhere — from tough new regulations
in Japan to sovereign wealth funds like Norway’s Norges
Bank Investment Management taking a more active
approach to their investments — and it is certain to continue
rising.94
There are various factors which are converging to incentivize nations
to improve their competitive edge through superior governance.
Three factors are driving these developments. First, today’s
deep economic uncertainty has broadened ordinary people’s
awareness of the influence that companies have on politics,
policy, and their own daily lives. And, as I have noted
previously, people are not only paying greater attention; they
also have more power than ever before to make their voices
heard. Second, there has been a burgeoning awareness
among governments that economic growth requires a
proactive regulatory approach. The third, and perhaps most
important, factor underpinning recent changes in corporate
governance has been the sharp rise in cross-border
investing.95
Is activism a virtuous component of improving a nation’s corporate
governance? A review of the various governance models is useful in
examining the question. Management agency conflicts such as shirking,
looting and positional96 are commonly found in jurisdictions with generally
widely dispersed shareholder bases (such as in the United States).97 In
94. Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015,
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gove
rnance.
95. Id.
96. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Hedge-Fund Activism: Principle Costs, Agency Costs,
and Governance Structures 15 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern Law
Soshnick Colloquium on Law and Economics), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/coll
oquium/law-economics/documents/2014_Goshen_Hedge_Fund.pdf.
97. This makes sense as smaller owners do not have the incentive or the time to pursue changes in
a company. A large owner has the monetary incentive to do so. To monitor and pursue legal action is
costly and of course by virtue of its large number of votes has influence in the company with respect to
removing and electing directors and can pressure or even remove management via a proxy fight or
takeover. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders And Corporate Control, 94 J. OF
POL. ECON. 461, 461 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52
J. OF FIN. 737, 753–54 (1997).
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dispersed ownership jurisdictions, small individual owners have no
influence on the company and managers have little or no concern for these
owners.98 In jurisdictions such as Japan, while there is concentrated
ownership, it is generally among allied companies, the outside individual
shareholders are dispersed and hold relatively few shares. In the absence of
a substantial shareholder, controlling owners, together with managers and
directors, are free to engage in self-serving strategy to the detriment of the
outside shareholders and the company. In the absence of the sword of
disciplinary action over their heads, directors and managers are
emboldened to treat the company’s resources as their own personal assets.
The following sub-sections describe the contrasting models of corporate
governance.
A. SHAREHOLDER-VALUE MODEL
United States corporate governance serves as the quintessential
exemplar of the shareholder-value model. United States corporate
governance is concerned with the fiduciary relationship between
management (directors, officers, and senior managers) and the shareholders
in the context of conflicts of interest. These divergent interests tend to
manifest themselves in three sometimes overlapping ways known as
management agency conflicts. One tension is the shirking conflict where
managers opt to concentrate on activities that will personally enrich
themselves rather than focus on corporate profits.99 The second conflict is
looting where the managers procure for themselves salaries and benefits
not commensurate with their work contribution to the company or the
results of the company.100 The third is positional where the managers seek
to entrench themselves by ensuring that they cannot easily be replaced.101
Illustrations of these conflicts can be gleaned from the case of SimonWorld-Wide, a publicly traded company in the United States, wherein a
major shareholder alleged that the directors and officers were engaged in
all three conflicts vis-à-vis the company and its shareholders. In a
regulatory filing, a major shareholder sent a letter to the company’s
directors outlining the conflicts of interest between the company’s
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COL. L. REV. 1461, 1471
(1989) (“All agents have a potential interest in working at a slack pace and in avoiding the effort and
discomfort involved in adapting to changed circumstances, such as the emergence of new
technologies.”).
100. Id. (“All agents have a potential interest in diverting the principal's assets to their own use.”).
101. Id. at 1472. (“[T]op corporate managers have the power to give expression to still a third
potential divergence of interest: an interest in maintaining and enhancing their positions even at the
shareholders' expense.”).
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managers, directors, and the shareholders.102 The letter alleged that the
directors: (1) had failed to hold a shareholders’ meeting for four years
(positional conflicts), (2) were being paid exorbitant salaries in light of the
business’s failure to earn any income (looting conflicts), and (3) were in
fact not even working at their offices (shirking conflicts).103
United States corporate governance is focused on addressing and
deterring these conflicts. Lawsuits are frequently filed in American courts
alleging that a company’s managers were engaged in one or more of these
conflicts which conflict with the shareholder-value mantra of United States
corporate governance.104 Delaware courts have adopted standards for
evaluating director conduct alleged to be tainted by these conflicts of
interest between management and shareholders.105
Pursuant to the shareholder-value approach, shareholders — as
owners of the business — are entitled to have the business run solely for
the benefit of the shareholders.106 Under the shareholder-centric model, the
directors are obligated to conduct the affairs of a company with the
objective of profit maximization for the shareholders.107 The rationale in
the shareholder-centric model is that the shareholders are the owners and
therefore the risk-bearers since the shareholders have risked their capital to
create a firm and employment opportunities.108 Because shareholders are
vital to economic prosperity, and have placed their money at risk, they
deserve to reap the rewards of their efforts. This theme is central to judicial
opinions in the United States that ascribe ultimate import to the
shareholder-value standard in evaluating director conduct, obligating the
directors to focus on shareholder profits and the corporation’s well-being.

102. Simon Worldwide Inc., Filing of Amendment to Schedule 13D (Form 13D/A) (May 11, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864264/000092189506001187/0000921895-06-001187.txt.
103. Simon Worldwide Inc., supra note 102.
104. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 283–84 (Del. Ch. 2003); see In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also Emon Reiser, Office DepotStaples Deal ‘Fraught with Conflict of Interest,’ Complaint Alleges, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:29
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2015/04/06/office-depot-staples-deal-fraught-withconfl ict-of.html; see Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (alleging that directors
were engaging in conflicts of interest with shareholders).
105. See Bernard Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under
Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 393 (2014) (“Delaware is the state where the majority of the
largest U.S. companies are incorporated, and its corporate law often serves as the authority that other
U.S. states and countries look to when developing their own statutory and case law.”).
106. See, e.g., Revlon Inc., 506 A.2d at 183. (“Although such considerations [of non-stockholder
corporate constituencies and interests] may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that
prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).
107. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (holding that board’s obligation is to act in “the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders”); see Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (1989).
108. Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders.
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Thus, under Delaware law, it is the responsibility of the directors to
maximize shareholder value as opposed to looking out for the interests of
other stakeholders.109 Directors in the United States may therefore have
liability for conduct that inhibits or diminishes the profits of shareholders.
B. ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER-VALUE MODEL
The United States was historically not alone in having this
shareholder-value focus. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada
were also traditionally considered shareholder-value countries. However,
in recent years, the trend in these other historically shareholder-centric
nations has been to mitigate the focus on profits by turning to what some
have referred to as “enlightened shareholder value.” Even some American
political110 and business leaders111 have come to advocate this model.
The United Kingdom has been the leader of the “enlightened
shareholder” trend.112 Pursuant to this model, “corporations should pursue
shareholder wealth with a long-run orientation that seeks sustainable
growth and profits based on responsible attention to the full range of
relevant stakeholder interests.”113 This approach was codified in the United
Kingdom by the landmark Companies Act 2006, which represented a key
shift away from the United States shareholder model towards a stakeholder
model.114
The Companies Act 2006 obligates directors to manage the company
in the “best interests” of the business.115 “Best interest” is arguably in
109. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price
available); see Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining, 535 A.2d 1334 (1987) (upholding directors’
defensive measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill agreement to thwart
activist investor since shares were valued more than the offer).
110. See Slawotsky, supra note 7 (“Critics of America’s shareholder-centric model allege that it is
archaic and a failure, and they believe that the American version of capitalism must undergo a dramatic
shift toward a stakeholder-based model emulating other nations . . . . President Obama recently echoed
the ‘sustainable capitalism’ theme by calling for major changes that would enhance the interests of
other stakeholders in order to construct an economy ‘built to last.’”).
111. See James Surowiecki, A Fair Day’s Wage, NEW YORKER, (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/09/fair-days-wage (noting Aetna’s CEO Mark Bertolini
stating “[c]ompanies are not just money-making machines” and commenting on pay raises: “[f]or the
good of the social order, these are the kinds of investments we [corporations] should be willing to
make.”).
112. Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take?, 17 INT’L CO. AND COMM. L. REV.
329, 339 (2006).
113. DAVID MILLON, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility and the Redefinition of
Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Ch. 4
(Edward Elgar, 2012).
114. See Keay, supra note 5; see also Aguilera, supra note 5.
115. See John Lowry, Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act
2006, INT’L REV. OF L. 5 (2012).
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between pure shareholder and stakeholder — a sort of middle ground.116
This middle ground is referred to as “enlightened shareholder value” or
“sustainable capitalism”117 and clearly marks a shift in United Kingdom
(“U.K.”) governance towards a stakeholder model.118 The fiduciary
obligations of U.K. directors were thus broadened by the 2006 U.K.
Companies Act to encompass interests other than shareholders. U.K.
directors are now obligated to act to promote the “success of the company,”
which envisions taking into account a varied list of stakeholders including:
employees, suppliers, customers, environmental concerns, the community,
and reputational business conduct.119
Directors in the U.K. are therefore under the threat of potential civil
liability for failure to take into regard these other stakeholders when
making business decisions.120 The enlightened shareholder model has also
made advances into traditionally shareholder-value nations, such as
Canada.121
C. STAKEHOLDER VALUE MODEL
The stakeholder value model is popular in the European Union and
Asia, and is growing globally122 although in an example of a
“counterattack,” the shareholder value-centric approach is also making
inroads into Norway, a historically stakeholder-centric jurisdiction.123
116. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the
Anglo American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 493, 500 (2005).
117. See, e.g., Gore & Blood, supra note 9 (“Before the crisis and since, we and others have called
for a more responsible form of capitalism, what we call sustainable capitalism: a framework that seeks
to maximize long-term economic value by reforming markets to address real needs while integrating
environmental, social and governance (ESG) metrics throughout the decision-making process.”).
118. Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a ForBenefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the US and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 271, 293 (2009).
119. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
120. Lowry, supra note 115.
121. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008), [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (BCE), at para 81 (Canadian
Supreme Court ruled that directors must balance various stakeholder interests “in accordance with their
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”
(emphasis added). The court in fact stated “[i]n considering what is in the best interests of the
corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors,
consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions.” Id. at par. 40. See also
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] SCC 68 (Can.), at para 42 (“We accept as
an accurate statement of law that in determining whether [directors] are acting with a view to the best
interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the
board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors,
consumers, governments and the environment.”).
122. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 11; see also Corrine M. Fiesel, Fiduciary Duties of Directors,
Corporate, Governance and the end of Shareholder Primacy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Butterworths, 2004).
123. See BLANPLAIN ET AL., supra note 2 (Norway has a stakeholder model of governance as

546

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:3

Under the stakeholder model, where the company is considered as a nexus
of “unwritten” contracts between various constituencies of the business
who may have an interest in it, it is the contract which determines the rights
and obligations of the various stakeholders.124 In terms of corporate
governance and company law, directors are to make decisions that take into
account the interests of these various “constituents” who are considered as
having “rights” in the company. These stakeholders in the business
encompass a wide array of interests including: creditors, employees,
suppliers, customers, the environment, and the community.
Pursuant to this governance architecture, the goal of a business should
not be strictly a grab for profits and shareholder returns. Rather, other
interests should be afforded a voice in corporate decision making. By
taking into account the concerns of not only shareholders but employees,
consumers, suppliers, the environment, local community impact, and the
wider global audience, the company’s success becomes the interest of
numerous stakeholders.
Presumably, numerous stakeholders will
encourage the company’s long-term success. Therefore, under the
stakeholder theory, director conduct that favors non-shareholders may not
necessarily constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty since the directors are
permitted to take into account and in fact possibly favor non-shareholders.
For example, pursuant to a stakeholder approach, a merger bid for a
higher share price may result in environmental degradation, and therefore
be voted down in favor of a lower bid from a rival with a better
environmental record, or a commitment not to pollute. Or directors could
favor customers, suppliers, or any stakeholder under the banner of
enlightened shareholder value. In the European Union, for example,
affirmative action programs are viewed in the broader context of
governance, as diversity in the boardroom constitutes a stakeholder value.
The European Union and its member states are also taking
an increasingly active approach to corporate governance,
including regulations concerning boardroom diversity. Italy,
France, Spain, Norway and others have all enacted
boardroom gender quotas, with companies required to fill
opposed to a shareholder model). But see Ruth Sullivan, Norwegian Wealth Fund Set to Raise Bar on
Governance, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 6:41 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea0ede56-0fc9-11e399e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zs3qenxh (Norway’s state owned SWF is shifting its traditional
corporate social responsibility based activism towards a broadening scope of activism to include
shareholder value. The Norwegian SWF is therefore moving towards a profits-centric shareholder
value activism); see also Investor Muscle, FIN. TIMES (Aug 8, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s /0/8eeb7524-002f-11e3-9c40-00144feab7de.html#axzz2zs3qenxh.
124. See Xin Denga et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization:
Evidence from Mergers, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 87, 87–88 (2013).
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30-40% of independent board seats with women. The latest
example can be found in Germany, where, after much
debate, new quotas require that from 2016 large companies
fill 30% of non-executive board seats with women.125
Thus, in a stakeholder jurisdiction, if the impact of a proposed
transaction could result in mass layoffs, then directors may be empowered
to block the transaction. In the context of a sale, directors in stakeholder
nations may be correct in exercising their business judgment by accepting a
lower offer if the lower offer arises from a competing bidder that has
agreed not to terminate employees or a bidder that will be more
community-oriented or will donate ten percent of profits to a human rights
organization. This would be distinguishable from the shareholder model of
the United States and its Revlon duties wherein directors are obligated to
achieve the maximum profit for the shareholders.
In Delaware, directors owe Revlon duties once a sale of the
corporation has been decided.126 Revlon duties mandate that the directors
obtain the best price possible for shareholders. In the United States
accepting a lower offer for any of the above-stated reasons would constitute
a violation of directors’ fiduciary obligations. In a shareholder-value
model, social or societal considerations are of little or no interest in the
drive for profits. In contrast, in a stakeholder-model, society’s interest in
advancing diversity may constitute a “stakeholder interest.”
In a shareholder-value model, enacting measures that make activist
conduct more difficult will be examined in light of the interests of the
shareholder. But in a stakeholder model, blocking activists may be seen as
acceptable or even beneficial if the activist plans to consolidate divisions
and terminate the excess employees. Under the stakeholder-model, the
potential permutations represent a daunting challenge in balancing various
stakeholder interests.
D. WILL U.S. STYLE ACTIVISM SPREAD?
As a shareholder-value-driven jurisdiction, the mantra of enhanced
shareholder returns fosters an environment conducive to activism in the
United States. As discussed above, activism is thriving in the United States
and has become a mainstream tactic to enhance shareholder returns.

125. Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015,
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gov
ernance.
126. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director misconduct in failing to seek highest price available).
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Shareholder activism has been slower to arrive in nations where
shareholder-value is not the modus operandi of corporate law. Indeed, in
many non-U.S. jurisdictions, activism is not viewed as virtuous and has not
been embraced.
European and Asian shareholders say they do not need
activists because they have more power than American
investors over managers’ pay and appointments. They
typically dismiss Mr. Icahn and his friends as an American
solution to an American problem. And, for cultural
reasons, the few European activists tend to be more
diplomatic and consultative than their brash cousins.127
However, despite previous reservations or hostility, activists are
beginning to copy the strategy in non-U.S. markets.128 This is hardly a
surprising development since “at the end of the day, American
shareholders, European shareholders and U.K. shareholders all want the
same thing . . . . We all want to make money and we all want management
and the board to work in alignment to create shareholder value.”129
Activist investing is spreading globally,130 beginning to appear, for
example, in Australia,131 Japan132 and Germany.133 Even in India, where
“[s]hareholders in listed companies . . . are known for their apathy towards

127. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18. See also Marlow, infra note 129 (“[T]he brash
approach has been less effective in the more conservative and stuffy boardrooms of Europe and the UK,
where pushy outsiders can find it difficult to exert any real influence.”).
128. Marco Becht et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (Oct. 30,
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Erasmus Research Institute of Management),
http://www.erim.eur.nl/fileadmi n/erimcontent/documents/Wagner1104.pdf.
129. Alexandra Stevenson, U.S. Activist Investor Turns Eyes Toward Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17,
2014, 4:00 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/u-s-activist-investor-turns-eyes-towardeurope/?module=BlogPostTitle&version=BlogMain&contentCollection=CorporateGovernance&action
=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body. See also Ben Marlow, Bosses beware: Activist raiders are
targeting UK plc, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/
11808504/Bosses-beware-Activist-raiders-are-targeting-UK-plc.html (“After years of false starts, it
looks like shareholders are starting to demand change at some of Britain’s big corporates.”).
130. Stevenson, supra note 129 (“It was only a matter of time before United States activist
investors turned their focus to European companies.”).
131. Paul Garvey, Activist Hedge Funds are Coming, but are Investors Ready?, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Apr. 21, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/activist-hedge-fundsare-coming-but-are-investors-ready/story-fn91v9q3-1227312571622.
132. Lawrence Delevingne, Keith Meister’s Corvex Takes Large Stake in Yum Brands: Sources,
CNBC (May 1, 2015, 10:54 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102631443 (noting activist hedge fund
Third Point’s growing activities in Japan).
133. See also Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst, Corporate Governance Convergence in
Germany Through Shareholder Activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse Bid for London Stock
Exchange, 16 J. MGMT. & GOV. 235 (2012) (discussing activism in the context of German corporate
governance).
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corporate governance and lack of active participation in companies’
decision-making process,”134 activism is starting to develop. In fact, “[i]n
recent times, especially due to the passage of investor friendly provisions in
the new Companies Act of 2013 and an increasingly proactive role played
by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI), there has been
increasing shareholder activism and participation in the country.”135
Although many continental European nations have a concentrated
shareholder ownership system whereby insiders, banks or families own
large percentages of shares thus “controlling” the company, shareholder
activists have commenced their activity. “Shareholder activism is an everpresent challenge to corporations in the US. Now, the trend has spread to
Europe.”136 In Italy, where concentrated ownership is common, scholars
have noted that activists have met with mixed success.137
Activists have demanded the break-up of Dutch financial
institution ABN AMRO, pressured the Italian oil company
ENI to restructure its operations, launched a proxy fight
against the management of French multinational Atos, and
succeeded in blocking Deutsche Boerse’s attempts to take
over the London Stock Exchange and oust its CEO.138
In another example, even South Korean shareholders — historically
not conducive to activists139 — have concluded that governance is
134. See Jay Sayta, Era of Shareholder Activism?, THE STATESMAN (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.
thestatesman.com/news/supplements/era-of-shareholder-activism/106554.html (“However, in recent
times, especially due to the passage of investor friendly provisions in the new Companies Act of 2013
and an increasingly proactive role played by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI), there
has been increasing shareholder activism and participation in the country.”).
135. Id.
136. See Latham & Watkins: Shareholder Activism is on the Rise, EUROPEAN CEO (Nov. 30, 2015),
http://www.europeanceo.com/business-and-management/latham-watkins-shareholder-activism-is-onthe-rise/ (“[A]ctivists in Europe have taken a more cooperative approach due to differing characteristics
in the legal and business framework. Historically speaking, this framework amounts to a less
confrontational tone in business communications and management approach from institutional
shareholders, greater union powers, mandatory co-determination requirements, and a requirement for
actions to focus on all stakeholders, not just shareholders.”).
137. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of
Concentrated and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421; Matteo Erede, Governing
Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: Can Hedge Fund Activism Play Any Role in
Italy?, CLEA ANNUAL MEETING PAPER (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ctid=1397562.
138. See Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons From the
American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438 (2014).
139. U.S. Hedge Fund Galvanizes Korean Shareholders to Pressure Samsung, South Korea’s
Richest Family, FOX BUS. (June 24, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2015/06/24/ushedge-fund-galvanizes-korean-shareholders-to-pressure-samsung-south-korea/.
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important and are objecting to being unfairly treated.140
Activists have commenced making incipient inroads in Japan,141 after
having failed for decades.142 Activists are somewhat emboldened as they
perceive recent moves towards governance reforms favorably.143 For
example, activist investor Third-Point
“continued to add to” its investment in Seven & i, it said in a
letter to investors Friday, without disclosing how large of a
stake it holds. It also proposed the Japanese company’s unit
Ito-Yokado Co., which has “notable record of
underperformance,” should be spun off and restructured as a
standalone company.144
Notwithstanding these stirrings, as discussed in Part V, activism in
Japan is sharply limited due to both the governance structure and the
business environment.
While activists are likely to continue their efforts in non-U.S. nations,
success in these jurisdictions will depend on the extent the activist can
acquire an adequate number of shares to vote directors onto the board and
replace managers. Cultural business norms will also substantially influence
the prospects of a successful activist campaign. Therefore, the governance
architecture and business environment are key to determining whether
activism can thrive thus forcing inefficient businesses to become more
productive. The next section examines Japan and the difficulty activists
face because of the governance model as well as the corporate culture.

140. Id.
141. See Dave McCombs & Jason Clenfield, Japan Inc.’s $104 Billion Investor Payout Set to Surge,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 28, 2015, 11:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0527/japan-inc-s-104-billion-investor-payout-set-to-surge (“In an example that would have been
inconceivable in years past, the secretive robot-maker Fanuc Corp. was prodded by American activist
Daniel Loeb into doubling the percentage of profit it would return to shareholders.”).
142. Id. (“Loeb’s success with Fanuc may be a sign foreign activists will finally find success in
Japan after decades of failure”).
143. See Tsuyoshi Inajima, Loeb’s Third Point Takes Stake in Japan’s Seven & I Holdings,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 31, 2015, 6:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1031/loeb-s-third-point-takes-stake-in-japan-s-seven-i-holdings (“Loeb’s investments come as he has
extolled Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to improve corporate governance, saying the move opens
the way for activist investors to gain by helping improve the way companies deploy cash. The Seven &
i investment is at least Loeb’s fifth in two years in Japan and follow his bets in Suzuki Motor Corp.,
robot maker Fanuc Corp., Sony Corp. and jet engine maker IHI Corp.”).
144. Id.
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V. IS SHAREHOLDER-VALUE DRIVEN ACTIVISM VIRTUOUS?
The context of governance models provides an excellent framework
from which to examine whether activism is virtuous. The above section
provided the general parameters of the various systems. The Article now
examines Japan and discusses whether hostility to shareholder activism has
negatively implications for economic performance.
A. DISCOURAGING ACTIVISM: THE EXAMPLE OF JAPAN
Japan holds stakeholder value as the corporate mantra.145 However,
Japanese corporate governance and the corporate environment makes clear
that “stakeholder value” is dedicated to the interests of the select “corporate
community.” This community consists of insiders, key employees, and
allied companies — the popular Keiretsu ownership structure — wherein
numerous allied entities have a crossholding in each other.146 Significantly,
these cross-holdings greatly reduce the importance of outside shareholders
as “outsiders” cannot meaningfully challenge the incumbent managers and
board due to a lack of voting power. Therefore, the prevalence of Keiretsu
groups substantially reduces the ability to implement a hostile take-over:
“[t]here are many more friendly mergers, which typically occur between
Keiretsu and other related firms, than mergers based on hostile takeovers.
Most hostile takeovers of poorly functioning firms or takeover attempts
have failed.”147
Moreover, in Japan, the corporate culture fosters conformity and
loyalty within this corporate community. A large number of parties are
thus allied with each other and constitute “company insiders” in the sense
that these interests and loyalties are with the company and its senior
management rather than to overall shareholder performance or the interests

145. Carlo Osi, Board Reforms with a Japanese Twist: Reviewing the Japanese Board of Directors
with a Delaware Lens, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 325, 336, 352 (2009) (“In post-war corporate
Japan, corporations are primarily managed for the stakeholders. This includes employees, banks,
suppliers, customers, business partners, the community and, in some respect, shareholders. This
stakeholder-oriented model is quite different from the shareholder primacy model advocated in the
United States.”).
146. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate
Law and their Solutions, 25 Del. J Corp. Law 189, 202 (2000) (“The Company Community consists of
management, board members, and core employees who share an identity as ‘company men.’ In Japan,
the word “company” refers to the collective Company Community . . . . Within their own minds,
members of the Company Community owe their loyalty to both the Community itself and their fellow
members.”).
147. Masao Nakamura, Has Japan’s corporate governance reform worked? EAST ASIA F. (Oct. 23,
2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/23/has-japans-corporate-governance-reform-worked/.
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of other “outside” shareholders.148 Corporate insiders are loyal to each
other and enjoy interlocking relationships which confer benefits to club
members.149
The prevalence and entrenchment of these Keiretsu cross-holdings
dissuade foreign capital and other potential outside shareholders from
risking capital in these businesses.150 Interestingly, these cross-holders,
who are in effect the quintessential loyal long-term investors, have reaped
the adverse financial consequences of their passivity.151 While the Keiretsu
structure has diminished over the last several years, it remains a powerful
characteristic of corporate Japan.152
Moreover, in corporate Japan, values such as loyalty, honor, and
fidelity trump shareholder value.153 These values are applicable to the
relationship among the senior managers and officers, allied companies,
business partners, and other insider stakeholders; they do not apply to
outsiders, nonaffiliated businesses, and “other” shareholders.
The
corporation’s outside owners’ interests lie dormant at the bottom of the
pyramid.154 Allied investors will continue to support a scandal plagued
business rather than institute reform. For example:

148. Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 483, 49596 (2011) (“If one company has difficulties, it is likely to be assisted by other
companies from the same keiretsu (the same as the villagers would help each other in case of
calamities); more powerful companies are expected to support smaller ones. The sense of obligation
towards the company may be linked with the sense of belonging to a family and the responsibility
towards one's own family. In the same sense, keiretsu also represents a kind of family with members
that feel close to each other. In this sense, keiretsu is not purely an economic concept but a cultural one,
as well.”)
149. Such insiders include senior officers, directors, government regulators, allied companies within
the keiretsu and other loyal parties. The allegiance to each other among insiders trumps all other
interests. See Osi, supra note 145, at 325 (discussing the phenomenon of conformity and loyalty in
Japan and the importance of banding together against outsiders. Also the fact that government
regulators know that they will land well-paying jobs post-government if they “play the game.”). As
will be detailed below, the recent Olympus and Toshiba frauds exemplify these characteristics of
corporate Japan. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, infra note 153.
150. See Leo Lewis, Japanese Banks to Accelerate Unwind of Cross-Shareholdings, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 21, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf714ea6-8b76-11e5-8be4-3506bf20cc2b.ht
ml#axzz3rejueQj6 (“The cozy, opaque relationships locked into the cross-shareholdings, say analysts,
are among many turn-offs for would-be investors.”).
151. See Shuli Ren, Japan’s Corporate Governance Woes, BARRONS (Oct. 24, 2015),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/japans-corporate-governance-woes-1445665396 ("Japan’s banks suffer
by operating as passive investors.").
152. See Lewis, supra note 150.
153. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford Blows Whistle on Company, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/15742048 (“But it’s a culture of deference and sycophants and yes men. I
mean in Japan people respect the position without questioning the person who takes and assumes that
position.”).
154. As noted below, this disregard for outside shareholders has played a significant role in
discouraging badly needed capital investment.
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Despite ISS’ shareholder-rights campaign, the presidents of
Japan’s top 200 companies received median voting support
of 96.6% . . . . Even the president of Toshiba (6502.Japan),
which lost a third of its market value from an accounting
scandal and write-downs, got a 94% approval rating. Some
76% and 91% of investors voted against dividend hikes and
share buybacks, respectively.155
Japan’s governance architecture and business culture is not friendly to
outsiders and represents:
. . . a deeply insular culture. Only 274 of some 40,000
directorships are held by foreigners.
A mesh of
shareholdings still binds big firms together. Japan’s
business lobby group, Keidanren, fought to dilute the new
reforms. The banks still keep weak companies afloat: the
fact that not one of Japan’s listed firms went bankrupt last
year, for the first time since 1991, reflects not just a zippier
economy, but also lenders’ clubby ties to borrowers. For
all his reformist zeal, Mr Abe has yet to embrace measures
that make it easier for firms to hire and fire. Hobbesian,
Japan is not.156
Viewed as outsiders, it is thus hardly surprising that activists have not been
welcomed by other shareholders.157
Another manifestation of Japan’s lack of good corporate governance
is Japan’s common “parent-child” ownership structure, which is viewed by
activists as an invitation to abuse.158 Activists have accordingly focused
their energy on these parent-child situations.159 This is “. . . mainly a
155. Ren, supra note 151.
156. See Meet Shinzo Abe, Shareholder Activist, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), http://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21653610-last-japan-has-introduced-corporate-governance-reforms-willmake-difference-meet-shinzo.
157 . See Kana Inagaki, Japan Is Hostile to Activist Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2013, 12:47
PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578482943175923954
(“Big
Japanese investors have generally circled the wagons to protect companies — with which they often
had deep shareholding and business ties — from intervention by outsiders. Historically, those networks
of big investors held large enough stakes that they could prevent hostile campaigns from succeeding.”).
158. Tom Redmond & Toshiro Hasegawa, Japan Post’s Unique IPO Turns Spotlight on ParentChild Listings, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 28, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2015-10-29/japan-post-s-unique-ipo-turns-spotlight-on-parent-child-listings (“Such listings are
already decreasing, according to data from Nomura. They fell to 284 at the end of March, an eighth
straight year of declines since 2007, when the Tokyo bourse said in a statement that parent-child
arrangements were “not always desirable.”).
159. Id.
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problem if units don’t increase their independence from the parent after
listing and eventually become separate entities . . . . This has been a
common pattern in Japan.”160
In a bid to reform governance and bring it in line with global “best
practices” Japan Post is being privatized.161 As a result:
That’s putting the spotlight back on a practice seen as open
to abuse: parent-child listings. The structure is a ‘barbarous
relic’ that has largely disappeared from other markets,
according to CLSA Ltd.’s Nicholas Smith, a strategist at the
brokerage, who notes the possibility for listed subsidiaries to
be plundered by their parents or forced into unprofitable
business at their behest.162
In sum, ordinary owners — the individual outside shareholders who
are not part of the web of alliances — are disdained. Therefore, the key
distinction between the United States and Japanese models of corporate
governance is Japan’s low regard for the interests of outside corporate
owners and high regard for the other stakeholders. In Japan, the interest of
non-insider shareholders is at the bottom of the pyramid, while other
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, creditors, and particularly the
“corporate community” of key insiders and allied companies, all trump the
interests of outside shareholders.163
Thus, the lack of vigorous activism in Japan to date has been caused
by a lack of truly outside shareholders and the Japanese business culture,
which has been hostile to activism for many years.164 The inability to
acquire a significant let alone a controlling percentage of shares prevents an
activist from influencing a company, let alone replacing the directors.
Moreover, unlike the United States, the other large holders are likely to
side with their fellow club insiders since concern for shareholder value is
not as important as loyalty and fidelity to allied interests. The difficulties
160. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra note 158.
161. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra note 158 (“It seems likely that changes in corporate governance
codes will ultimately put an end to this barbarous relic,” Smith wrote in a report this year. “Parent-child
listings seem a clear violation of the principle of equal treatment of shareholders.”)
162. Redmond & Hasegawa, supra note 158.
163. Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 483, 48990 (2011).
164. See Dave McCombs & Jason Clenfield, Japan Inc.’s $104 Billion Investor Payout Set to Surge,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 27, 2015, 11:29 pm), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0527/japan-inc-s-104-billion-investor-payout-set-to-surge (“In the early 1990s, hostile-takeover pioneer T.
Boone Pickens said he was giving up on Japan after losing a battle to gain a board seat at auto-parts
maker Koito Manufacturing Co. Steel Partners Chairman Warren Lichtenstein ultimately abandoned his
takeover bid for beer-maker Sapporo Holdings Inc. in 2007.”).
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activists have encountered may very well be both a symptom of the
economic malaise afflicting Japan and an impediment to an improvement.
1. The Economic Context
After World War II, Japan enjoyed robust economic growth which at
its peak created the world’s second biggest economy, just behind the
United States.165 Japan’s fall from second place is starkly framed when
viewed from the perspective of the 1980s when Japan was perceived to
possibly overtake the United States.166
For Japan, whose economy has been stagnating for more
than a decade, the figures reflect a decline in economic and
political power. Japan has had the world’s second-largest
economy for much of the last four decades, according to the
World Bank. And during the 1980s, there was even talk
about Japan’s economy some day overtaking that of the
United States.167
However, Japan’s performance has been so lackluster that it has fallen
behind China, and is now the world’s number three economy. Japan is
perilously close to slipping to the fourth position and being replaced by
India.168 By some measures India has already taken the number three
position from Japan.169
Japan’s economic downturn commenced in the early 1990s and has
continued into 2016 — a twenty-five year malaise coinciding with the rise
of intensified globalization and competition. The Japanese economy has

165. See Justin McCurry & Julia Kollewe, China Overtakes Japan’s World’s Second-Largest
Economy, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb
/14/china-second-largest-economy (“China has leapfrogged Japan to become the world's second-largest
economy, a title Japan has held for more than 40 years.”).
166. Dhruva Jaishankar, The Specter of Japan-Like Stagnation, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 19, 2015, 10:35
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/02/19/japans-economic-stagnation-is-acautionary-tale-for-europe (“By the 1980s, Japan was a global economic powerhouse, giving us Sony,
Toyota and Nintendo, pioneering the bullet train and buying up American real estate. Business leaders
the world over scrambled to learn the secrets behind the country’s success.”).
167. David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=all.
168. See Enda Curran & Keiko Ujikane, Planes, Trains and Automobiles Showcase Japan
Innovation Push, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 4, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-01-04/planes-trains-and-automobiles-showcase-japan-innovation-push (“As part of Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s drive to reinvigorate the world’s third-largest economy.”).
169. See Ankit Panda, World Bank: India Overtakes Japan as World’s Third Largest Economy,
DIPLOMAT (May 1, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/world-bank-india-overtakes-japan-as-worlds
-third-largest-economy/ (noting World Bank conclusion that Japan had fallen into fourth place).
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been marked by recession, deflation, and low growth for many years.170 In
fact, Japan entered its fourth recession in twenty years in 2015.171
2. Recognizing Governance as a Problem
In response to this economic under-performance, corporate
governance reform has become an urgent task.172 Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe has urged companies to transform their corporate governance “with
more transparency and independent board members.”173 Abe has pressured
Japanese companies to become more attractive to foreign investors noting
Japan requires more capital from global investors.174
As a result, “[t]he main focus of these changes . . . is really to bring
Japanese board practices in line with other western countries in a bid to
attract greater investment from overseas institutions . . . . Abe’s
government is seeking ‘a total governance revolution.’”175
The reforms seek to foster “a more equal environment among
shareholders, by ensuring more disclosure and transparency, by specifying
the responsibilities of company boards, and by requiring outside
independent directors on company boards, the codes enshrine changes that
make Japan more attractive for foreign investors.”176
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is prodding companies to become more
responsive to shareholders. Abe[’s] advisers worked with the Tokyo Stock
170. See OECD Economic Surveys: JAPAN 4 (Apr. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Japan2015-overview.pdf (“Two decades of sluggish growth and persistent deflation have reduced Japanese
living standards below the OECD average.”).
171. See Keiko Ujikane, Japan Falls Into Recession for Second Time Under ‘Abenomics,’
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 15, 2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1115/japan-s-economy-contracted-entered-recession-in-third-quarter (“Japan’s economy contracted in the
third quarter as business investment fell, confirming what many economists had predicted: The nation
fell into its second recession since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in December 2012.”).
172. See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“Noting the generally robust performance of the economies of
the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, the Japanese government decided to adopt a US
(or, more broadly, Anglo-American) style corporate governance system over the last decade or so. A
range of corporate governance reforms were instituted, aiming to facilitate market based transactions,
competition, individual shareholder rights, as well as transparency and information disclosure. Japan’s
economic regulatory institutions were also reformed. New laws were introduced and existing laws
revised, including company law, the commercial code, the anti-monopoly law, and the financial
instruments and exchange act.”).
173. Chris Cooper, Season of Scandal Hits Japan with Flurry of Corporate Confessions, JAPAN
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/21/business/season-scandal-hitsjapan-flurry-corporate-confession/#.VkWQSnYrK70.
174. Id.
175. See Foreign Investors and Japanese Corporate Governance, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL (July
20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/foreign-investors-and-japanese-corporate-gove
rnance/.
176. Lucy P. Marcus, Positive Changes in Corporate Governance, GULF TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015,
11:29 PM), http://www.gulf-times.com/opinion/189/details/453138/positive-changes-in-corporate-gove
rnance.
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Exchange to develop the JPX-Nikkei Index 400, also known as the Shame
Index to get companies focused on investors and profitability. Now
companies from Mitsubishi Corp. to Hoya Corp. are raising dividends and
announcing billions of dollars worth of share buybacks. Others including
Hitachi Ltd. have adopted performance-based pay for executives and
bellwethers such as Sony Corp. are setting targets for return on equity, a
measure that tends to rise with dividends and buybacks. 177
Under the new governance code, Japanese corporations must explain
why they have ownership interests in various entities. “The cozy, opaque
relationships locked into the cross-shareholdings, say analysts, are among
many turn-offs for would-be investors.”178
Corporate Japan has
commenced reducing these cross-holdings:
. . . actually starting to realize some of their crossshareholdings, which frees up capital within the business,
not only to return to shareholders but also to focus on more
capital efficiency within the organization. Quite often that
leads to enhanced shareholder returns either in the shape of
dividends or share buybacks.179
However, it remains to be seen whether these governance proposals
will in fact be the tonic Japan urgently needs.180 Recent examples
demonstrate that real reform will be difficult to implement.181 Despite
promises, a transformed governance architecture, systemic failures
continue to plague Japan.182 As will be discussed in the following subsection, the Olympus and Toshiba frauds are a manifestation of deeply
embedded traits of corporate loyalty, cover-up, and lack of accountability
177. See McCombs & Clenfield, supra note 164.
178. See Lewis, supra note 150.
179. See Foreign Investors, supra note 175.
180. See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But have the issues that motivated the reforms been solved in
the decade since they were adopted? Has the market for corporate control achieved competitive market
principles, transparency and information disclosure? And was the share value maximization principle
fully adopted by Japanese managers? The answer to these questions are mostly no. This was largely
predictable given Japan’s historical reaction to the transplantation of Western institutions over the long
sweep of history since the Meiji Restoration in 1868.”).
181. See Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But the fact that the problem was continuing even though
Toshiba had already implemented a US-style executive committee board system is an example of
reform failure. Clearly their outside directors did not function as expected. And neither did the
accounting firm that audited Toshiba.”).
182. See Cooper, supra note 173 (“Three companies disclosed internal malfeasance in the space of
24 hours last week, including a firm that says one of its units tried to cover up the faulty construction of
an apartment building that started to tilt, and another that says one of its units falsified reports on the
quality of rubber used in trains and ships. The admissions come after Toshiba Corp. admitted to
artificially inflating profits for almost seven years, and Takata Corp. said it supplied faulty air bags,
leading to the recall of more than 40 million vehicles.“).
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which do not bode well for governance improvement.183 In the context of
Toshiba, which had presumably accepted governance reform, the immense
governance failures corroborates concerns that Japan is not meaningfully
changing.184
3. Recent Examples of Governance Failures and the Link to an Absence of
Activism
The problem of Japanese governance has been evident for some
time.185 However, the Olympus accounting scandal provides an exemplar
of managerial and director misconduct that would be almost
incomprehensible in a jurisdiction with the potential for vigorous
shareholder activism.186 The Olympus CEO, U.K. national Michael
Woodford, was literally treated as an “enemy” and an “outcast” and fired
for “disloyalty” in revealing a massive internal accounting fraud.187
Woodford’s fall commenced after he had serious questions concerning
the company’s accounting. Woodford raised the possibility that accounting
improprieties had taken place and was immediately branded a “disloyal
183. See Cooper, supra note 173 (noting “tolerance for employee wrongdoing, in contrast to the
zero-tolerance policies at the world’s best-managed companies”).
184. See The Rot Inside Japan Inc., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/the-rot-inside-japan-inc-1441842664 (“Toshiba shows the need for a corporate-governance
overhaul”).
185. Questions about nuclear safety arose in connection with Tokyo Electric. See Japanese
Corporate Scandals: A Critical Mass of Disgust? ECONOMIST (Sept. 5, 2002, 11:41 AM), http://www.
economist.com/node/1318056 (“The latest company to be caught deceiving the public is Tokyo Electric
Power (TEPCO), Japan’s largest utility, which turns out to have filed at least 29 falsified reports to
nuclear-safety regulators since the 1980s.”).
The issue of company loyalty to managers causes companies to cover-up problems even if the
outside shareholders will bear the brunt of future losses. Id. (“In Japan, however, businessmen and
bureaucrats often respond to such public worries by engaging in more secrecy rather than less.
Occasionally, this leads to an even bigger scandal, and thus more hand-wringing.”).
Indeed, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant crisis was the product of “the disturbing catalog of
accidents that have occurred over the years and been belatedly reported to the public, if at all. See also
Scandal Ridden Energy Company behind Japan’s Nuke Crisis, CBS NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scandal-ridden-energy-company-behind-japans-nuke-crisis/; Fukushima
report: Key points in nuclear disaster report, BBC NEWS (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news
/world-asia-18718486 (“Collusion and lack of governance: the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and [private plant operator]
TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be
safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly ‘manmade’ . . . We
believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems . . . rather than issues
relating to the competency of any specific individual.”).
186. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 13 (“In Japan, values such as loyalty, honor, and fidelity are
also more important than shareholder profits. But these values are applicable mainly to the relationship
between the corporation and its senior managers, employees, allied companies, business partners, and
other insider stakeholders; they do not apply to outsiders, non affiliated businesses, and owners. The
corporation’s owners are at the bottom of the pyramid.”).
187. See Slawotsky, supra note 7, at 13
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traitor”188 and disrespected at the company.189 The “disloyalty” was not to
the company and its owners but rather to the Olympus management, insider
directors, and senior officers who had clearly benefited from the criminal
activity and thus desired to cover up the accounting fraud. Shortly
thereafter, a board meeting was convened and without any discussion of the
accounting fraud and without any interest in hearing Woodford and
discussing the fraud despite his presence, Woodford was summarily and
unanimously fired.190 Incredibly, rather than create an internal uproar, the
directors were unanimous in their disdain for Woodford and no dissenting
director came to Woodford’s defense. Subsequent to his firing, even the
Japanese shareholders who logically would be upset that Woodford was
fired were not complaining. Woodford relates:
Non-execs are there to hold the executive to account. They
are there to look after the interests of the shareholders.
Which brings me onto the shareholders. The western
shareholders, the American, European, Hong Kong, they
are asking me to go back, but the Japanese shareholders
have not said anything. I mean the company has lost 80%
of its value since I was dismissed three-and-a-half weeks
ago. It has now been put on the watch list by the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. It’s in a critical position. But the
Japanese shareholders haven’t said a word — one
comment by Nippon Life two weeks ago saying we would
like the full facts and clarity. That’s tepid. You know, it’s
meaningless.191

188. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, supra note 153. (“But it’s a culture of deference and
sycophants and yes men. I mean in Japan people respect the position without questioning the person
who takes and assumes that position.”).
189. See Karl Taro Greenfield, The Story Behind the Olympus Scandal, BLOOMBERG BUS.
(Feb. 16, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-02-16/the-story-behind-the-oly
mpus-scandal#p4 (“Woodford noticed that while the two Japanese men had sumptuous plates of sushi
before them, he was served a tuna sandwich.”).
190. See id. (“The board met the next morning, Friday, October 14. Kikukawa took to the podium
and read a prepared statement. ‘The board meeting scheduled to discuss concerns relating to the
company’s M&A activity is cancelled. Instead, we have a new agenda. The first is to discuss the
motion to dismiss Mr. Woodford as president, representative director, and CEO. Mr. Woodford cannot
speak because he is an interested party. All those in favor?’ (Board meetings at Olympus were
simultaneously translated from Japanese to English and vice versa.) All 12 board members present
immediately raised their hands.”).
191. See Former Olympus Boss Woodford, supra note 153 (“Subsequently, Olympus “apologized”
for the dismissal.”); see also OLYMPUS CORP., NOTICE CONCERNING PAST ACTIVITIES REGARDING
DEFERRAL IN POSTING OF LOSSES (2011), available at http://www.olympus-global.com/en/common/
pdf/nr111108e.pdf.
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The Olympus saga provides the archetype exemplar of loyalty among allied
insider shareholders and employees at the expense of the disdained outside
shareholders.
The recent Toshiba scandal also corroborates the tale of poor
governance plaguing Japan.192 Toshiba, once a leading Japanese company
employing hundreds of thousands,193 admitted to a huge multi-year, billion
dollar accounting scandal, after being caught. The once mighty business
entity has suffered huge financial losses, a plunging share price and debt
cut to junk.194 Yet Toshiba managers and officers were more concerned
about protecting insiders who planned/profited and or covered up the fraud
than promoting the interests of the outside shareholder-owners. As one
governance expert notes, there seems to be “100% tolerance” for
managerial cover-ups.
Nicholas Benes, representative director of the Board
Director Training Institute of Japan, was critical of Toshiba
this month when the company said it had identified 30
executives who had been involved in the accounting scandal
— and none of them would lose their jobs. He said the
company was showing “100 percent tolerance” for employee
wrongdoing in contrast to the zero-tolerance policies at the
world’s best-managed companies.195
While Toshiba has made some efforts at showing “remorse” and
demonstrating “concern” the reality is more show than substance.196 The
192. Japan’s Toshiba conceded that it had engaged in a multi-billion dollar accounting fraud for
almost a decade. See Michal Addady, Toshiba’s Accounting Scandal Is Much Worse than We Thought,
FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/toshiba-accounting-scandal/ (“Toshiba
admitted on Monday that it had overstated its profits by nearly $2 billion over the past 7 years, the Wall
St. Journal reports . . . . Evidently, Toshiba managers “set aggressive profit targets that subordinates
could not meet without inflating divisional results were under pressure to report growing profits . . . .
After the admission, Toshiba’s shares fell dramatically.”).
193. Annual Report, Operational Review 2012, TOSHIBA, http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/en/fin
ance/ar/ar2012/tar2012eor.pdf.
194. See Akashi Mochizuki & Eric Pfanner, Toshiba, Facing $4.5 Billion Loss, Plans Deep Cuts,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/toshiba-expects-4-5-billion-loss-for-currentfiscal-year-1450686830 (“Toshiba, racked by one of Japan’s biggest accounting scandals, also said it
would eliminate nearly 8,000 jobs amid heavy restructuring costs at the conglomerate. The accounting
scandal has morphed into a wider crisis affecting nearly all of Toshiba’s significant units. Shares in the
company plunged 9.8% Monday and have lost more than half their value since March.”). See Finbarr
Flynn, Toshiba’s Credit Rating Lowered Two Levels to Junk by Moody’s, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2015,
1:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/toshiba-s-credit-rating-lowered-twolevels-to-junk-by-moody-s (“Toshiba Corp.’s long-term senior bond rating was cut two levels by
Moody’s Investors Service to Ba2, it’s second-highest junk rating, from Baa3. That was followed by a
downgrade to sub-investment grade by Standard & Poor’s.”).
195. Cooper, supra note 173.
196. See Makiko Yamazaki, Toshiba Lawsuit Highlights Japan Governance Reform Still Lacking:
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amount of money sought in recovery from former officers constitutes only
a fraction of the actual loss in shareholder value.197 Moreover, “Toshiba
has yet to fully explain why it is limiting its lawsuit to just five former
executives, effectively absolving some current officials who were in senior
roles during the years it was padding profits.”198
Furthermore, and troubling, Toshiba had already implemented
corporate governance reform. The fact a multi-billion dollar fraud occurred
post-reform speaks volumes. “[T]hat the problem was continuing even
though Toshiba had already implemented a US-style executive committee
board system is an example of reform failure. Clearly their outside
directors did not function as expected. And neither did the accounting firm
that audited Toshiba.”199
In a governance structure where a company CEO is summarily ousted
for revealing internal fraud, and directors are more concerned about
protecting their friends and allies rather than recovering company assets,
activist investors attempting governance changes will also likely be met
with robust resistance if not outright hostility. Moreover, based upon the
inter-locking ownership structure of the Keiretsu groups, acquiring a
dominant or controlling percentage of shares is not merely daunting, it is
impossible. Therefore, engaging in activism in Japan is extremely difficult.
Without activists monitoring and possibly removing directors, the directors
and managers of a company have little incentive to avoid conflicts of
interest and in fact have every incentive to manage the company for the
advancement of their own private interests and the interests of their allied
companies/shareholders.
If insiders and managers can exploit a company’s assets, productivity
and overall economic performance will decline. An economy may thus be
derailed by allowing management to continue to mismanage the corporate
sector. This lack of incentive to improve shareholder performance and the
disregard of outside shareholders in order to preserve or enhance the selfinterest of management makes activism an important available strategy to
prevent insider exploitation.
The Japanese governance architecture and corporate Japan’s emphasis
on loyalty to insiders served Japan well until globalization and intensive
Lawyers, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/12/us-toshiba-lawsuitidUSKCN0T10AA20151112 (“Toshiba Corp’s (6502.T) lawsuit against former executives linked to a
$1.3 billion accounting scandal is a defensive manuever that highlights a lack of sincere reform, lawyers
and corporate governance experts said.”).
197. See id. (“The 300 million yen ($2.44 million) in damages Toshiba is seeking pales in
comparison with the over $7 billion decline in stock market value since the accounting problems came
to light in early April.”).
198. Id.
199. Nakamura, supra note 147.
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competition rendered many companies inefficient. Japan, by keeping
activists at bay, appears to be delaying the solution to what ails corporate
Japan. The lack of activism over the last twenty-five years may have
delayed the governance turn-around so crucial to reforming corporate
Japan. While the lack of activism was certainly a boon to managers and
inside directors, enabling them to retain their positions and reap the
rewards, the absence of activism allowed managers and directors to
continue to mismanage their companies causing severe damage to Japan.
Whether Japan can successfully implement the vital governance
reform is an open question. Corporate Japan has largely resisted
implementing the spirit of reform.
Independent, outside directors have been put in place, but
they do not seem to function as they do in the US. And,
transparency and information disclosure have proven
difficult to implement in many established Japanese firms.
The continuing prevalence of Japan’s ‘dango’ practice
(rigged bidding), for example, clearly violates the reforms’
transparency and information disclosure as well as fair
competition objectives.200
There is precedent for the unwillingness to embrace Western political
and economic models.
Since Japan opened up to the West in the early 19th century,
there have been repeated attempts to import Western
political and economic institutions, laws, technologies and
even cultural practices. But rather than being adopted in
their original forms, Western practices have been selectively
adapted to suit Japan’s needs, tastes and preferences with
varied success.201
Without meaningful changes in the governance of Japan Inc., any
influx of foreign capital may be a short-term phenomenon. In fact,
“[f]oreign investors flocked to Japan earlier this year and then just as
quickly exited in the past few months.”202 It should be noted that:
200. Nakamura, supra note 147.
201. Id.
202. Ren, supra note 151. See also Anna Kitanaka et al., Black Rock Joins $46 Billion Japan
Pullout, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0410/abenomics-rebuked-as-blackrock-joins-46-billion-japan-pullout (“Starting in the first days of
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The problems that motivated the Japanese reforms are far
from being solved. Foreign firms will still need to beware of
the implications of this in doing business in Japan.
Corporate governance reforms to implement US-style
practices are ongoing in other countries in East Asia, such as
China and South Korea. Large pyramidal business groups in
both countries (that is, state-owned enterprise groups and
chaebols) present serious challenges to those reform efforts
too. Implanting institutions and practices from other
countries rarely succeeds.
Japan’s experiences, both
successes and failures, may prove helpful to Western
business practitioners and policymakers interested in
understanding business conditions in East Asia.203
Japan provides an illustrious example of the perils inherent in a
governance structure that gives little heed to shareholder value and
simultaneously provides perhaps the archetype example of the benefits of
shareholder activism.
B. THE VIRTUES OF UNITED STATES ACTIVISM
Not surprisingly, activism is vibrant in the United States, where the
governance mantra is shareholder value. This is in keeping with corporate
law rulings emphasizing that a company must be managed to maximize the
value to the company and its shareholders.204 Activists ideally target
companies whose management is involved in various agency conflicts with
shareholders. These conflicts can be shirking, where the managers shirk
their obligations in favor of pursuing their own self-interest, or looting,
where the managers exploit the assets of the company for their personal
advantage.205 Activism seeks to change the status quo and attempts to
extract more value to shareholders.

2016, foreign traders have been pulling out of Tokyo’s stock market for 13 straight weeks, the
longest stretch since 1998. Overseas investors dumped $46 billion of shares as economic reports
deteriorated, stimulus from the Bank of Japan backfired and the yen’s surge pressured exporters.
The benchmark Topix index is down 17 percent in 2016, the world’s steepest declines behind Italy.”)
203. Nakamura, supra note 147.
204. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (finding director conduct impermissible and a violation of their
fiduciary duties in not sharing the highest value for the shareholders).
205. See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative
View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 105 (1998) (describing managerial agency conflicts that
plague companies with a dispersed shareholder base as commonly found in the United States).
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Taking advantage of regulatory changes and a public mood,
oriented toward rooting out corporate misdeeds, a growing
number of hedge fund managers have taken up Mr. Icahn’s
tactics to wage populist battles against chief executives. In
letters, often colorfully worded, tacked on to filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, they are demanding
that executives sell off units, pay dividends or take other
actions to raise stock prices quickly.206
Corporate law rulings have established unequivocally that in the
United States, a company must be managed in the pursuit of the interests of
the owners — the shareholders. Failure to do so is a violation of the
fiduciary duties of directors and managers. Therefore, the United States
markets and corporate law permit and reward activists who can bring
enhanced value to shareholders.
By allowing an environment conducive to activism, the United States
enables activists to serve as backup monitors of management and directors.
There are tangible benefits to shareholders. Jurisdictions which discourage
activism, greatly increase the risks of bad corporate governance. By
eliminating or lessening the options for activists, managerial slack can
become entrenched. Insulating directors and managers affords them the
opportunity to exploit the business for their own self-interest. The decision
of whether to close divisions or to liquidate the company itself may be
tinged with director and managerial conflicts of interest.
The “market for corporate control” is vital in imbuing activists with
the ability to transform an inefficiently run business to the benefit of the
company and its shareholders. In fact:
The “market for corporate control” idea is that poor and
inefficient management of a public company depresses its
stock price. And if the stock price is sufficiently low, a
hostile outsider can buy a controlling block, even at a
premium, and turn a profit by shifting control from the
206. Riva D. Atlas, Some Funds Taking Role Far Beyond Just Investor, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/business/some-funds-taking-role-far-beyond-just-investor.
html.
Sometimes the activists seek board seats. See Katya Kazakina, Billionaire Loeb Confirmed as
Sotheby’s New Board Member, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2014 9:02 AM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2014-05-29/billionaire-loeb-confirmedas-sotheby-s-new-board-member.html.
(“Billionaire hedge-fund manager Dan Loeb was confirmed as Sotheby’s (BID) newest director
following a closely watched proxy fight between the auction house and its largest shareholder. Loeb
and five others were officially appointed to the board today at Sotheby’s annual shareholder meeting in
New York. The activist investor sat in the front row of the room. His Third Point LLC owns 9.65
percent of Sotheby’s shares, according to a regulatory filing.”).
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incumbent board to a new board selected by the outsider.
That new board will likely terminate the incumbent senior
executives — clearly a poor outcome for them. Executives
are aware of this, and thus the market for corporate control
incentivizes executives to work hard to keep the share price
high and rising, so as not to end up a casualty of a hostile
takeover. The disciplining effect of the threat of hostile
takeover is widely viewed as a powerful way to align the
interests of management with those of shareholders, a core
issue at the heart of the public corporation.207
In contrast to Japan where a change in corporate control is difficult for
activists to achieve,208 the take-over market is robustly encouraged in the
United States by a shareholder-value centric governance model.
Moreover, real economic benefits in the form of shareholder returns,
managerial performance, and long-term operating income arise from
activism.209 A recent analysis of activism on the operating performance of
target companies had important conclusions:
[Activist] intervention is associated with productivity gains
at the plants of the targeted companies. We also measure the
performance of plants that were sold subsequent to
intervention and find that they were among the worst
performing plants at the time of divesture, but later
experience a substantial improvement under new ownership
relative to a matched sample. We find that employees of
target firms experience a reduction in work hours and
stagnation in wages while their productivity improves.
These results support the view that hedge fund activists
facilitate improvements in productive efficiency by
improving the productivity of assets-in-place and by capital
re-allocation. Overall, the evidence provided in the paper

207. See Schwartz, supra note 75, at 241.
208. Nakamura, supra note 147 (“But have the issues that motivated the reforms been solved in the
decade since they were adopted? Has the market for corporate control achieved competitive market
principles, transparency and information disclosure? And was the share value maximization principle
fully adopted by Japanese managers? The answer to these questions are mostly no.”).
209. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
THE J. OF FIN. Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (Aug. 2008), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research
/pubfiles/4128/Hedge%20fund%20activism%20Final.pdf (“To summarize, we find that hedge fund
activism is associated with an almost immediate increase in payout, heightened CEO discipline, and an
improvement in analyst sentiment. On the other hand, the improvement in operating performance takes
longer to manifest.”).
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highlights the real and fundamental effects that hedge fund
activists facilitate at target firms.210
Improving the performance of companies will clearly have a positive
effect on national economic performance including incentivizing more
innovation.211 Another benefit of activism is a counterbalance to the rising
influence of “lazy investors” such as passive index funds and ETFs that do
not involve themselves in company performance as their function is to
track the shares or the overall index. Doing so gives a “free ride” to
directors and managers and governance will suffer. As a result:
[A]ctivists fill a governance void that afflicts today’s public
companies. A rising chunk of the stock market sits in the
hands of lazy investors. Index funds and exchange-traded
funds mimic the market’s movements, and typically take
little interest in how firms are run; conventional mutual
funds and pension funds that oversee diversified portfolios
dislike becoming deeply involved in firms’ management. In
the face of Wall Street’s provocateurs, America’s lazy
money is waking up. Whether their ideas are barmy or
brilliant, the activists make it harder for investors to stay on
the sidelines. Mutual funds and pension funds are being
forced to take a view, and hence become more active and
forward-looking. European and Asian shareholders say they
do not need activists because they have more power than
American investors over managers’ pay and appointments.
They typically dismiss Mr. Icahn and his friends as an
American solution to an American problem. And, for
cultural reasons, the few European activists tend to be more
diplomatic and consultative than their brash cousins. Yet
wherever there are stock markets you will find
underperforming companies, clubbable bosses and lazy
capital. The public company was never meant to be a
bureaucracy run by distant managers accountable to funds

210. Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and
Labor Outcomes, THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. (2015), rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/26/
rfs.hhv037
211. Julian Atanassov, Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover
Legislation and Corporate Patenting, THE J. OF FIN., Vol. 68, pp 1097–1131 (2013) (finding a negative
correlation between jurisdictions that enact anti-takeover laws with patents).
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run by computers. The activist revolt will help give it a new
lease of life.212
The superior economy enjoyed by the United States demonstrates the
virtues of activism. While United States economic performance is not
without soft patches, as compared to both continental Europe and Japan,
the United States has significantly better national economic performance.213
Indeed, the need to foster activism globally is demonstrated by at least one
study bolstering the case for encouraging activism across borders. A study
of nearly 1800 activist “attacks” in almost two dozen nations on target
companies from 2000-2010 had several interesting conclusions.214 These
activist moves ranged the gamut from takeover attempts to engagement
over executive compensation to dividend policy.215 The study concluded
that certain types of activism, such as takeovers and restructuring, created
shareholder value.216 The analysis also concluded that other, non-activist
types of conduct, failed to increase shareholder value,217 while “[a]ctivist
engagements that are successful in achieving a corporate restructuring,
particularly a takeover, or multiple objectives, generate significant value
for shareholders.”218
Although, as in anything, potential for abuse exists,219 it would be
counter-intuitive to believe that activists do not substantially benefit
portfolio companies.220 Directors and managers are charged with the duty
to monitor companies on behalf of shareholders and to obtain the best value

212. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18.
213. See Eduardo Porter, Economic Health? It’s Relative, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/us-economy-is-doing-well-compared-with-other-nations
.html?_r=0 (”A more illuminating question is how we have done relative to other countries that were
caught in the global financial cataclysm. By that standard, economic growth in the United States has
done surprisingly well.”).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Zeke Faux, Icahn Says BlackRock’s Finks Makes Fixing Bad Businesses Harder, BLOOMBERG
(May 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-03/icahn-says-blackrock-s-finkmakes-fixing-bad-businesses-harder (“Some of the other investors who call themselves activists are
really out to “pump and dump” stocks, Icahn said. They announce their intentions to pressure
management, he said, then get out as soon as the share price rises.”).
220. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“The Economist has analysed the 50 largest
activist positions in America since 2009. More often than not, profits, capital investment and R&D have
risen.”); Becht et al., supra note 128 (“Our analysis however provides evidence that increases in
shareholder value of firms targeted by activists are not simply short-term. Increases in shareholder
value due to activism are also tightly linked to activists achieving their goals. In Europe and North
America, where activists are more successful in achieving outcomes, gains for shareholders are larger
than in Asia, where activists have seen limited success.”).
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for shareholders,221 yet frequently fail to do so.222 Activism can keep a
check on badly run companies and activists’ efforts enable smaller
shareholders to be rescued from manipulative or corrosive management. In
a very real sense, activists can be said to replace directors when directors
fail to act.223
U.S.-style activism is good; it works. Accordingly, calls for curtailing
or eliminating shareholder activism should be rejected.
While
modifications in disclosure regulations may be justified given technological
advancement and financial product innovation, activism is virtuous and
should be encouraged.224
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States business landscape and the governance architecture
is being profoundly influenced by activist funds.225 “Activist investors . . .
are a burgeoning breed. They’re revamping governance and executive-pay
practices at companies big and small by doing more than winning or
merely threatening proxy fights.”226
Activism and has engendered a vigorous debate in the United States
and beyond. Proponents and opponents have legitimate arguments. On
one hand, these activists may be overly focused on immediate profit and
may employ stealth techniques to acquire shares. Yet, activists also
221. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173 (corroborating that shareholder value is the primary driver of U.S.
corporate governance). See also David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 181 (2014) (maximization of shareholder value is centric to United States corporate law); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO L.J. 439, 439 (20002001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally
strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465, 51035 (2007) (detailing the judicial opinions holding that “shareholder value . . . as the ultimate
corporate objective”).
222. Capitalism’s Unlikely Heroes, supra note 18 (“Yet wherever there are stock markets you will
find underperforming companies, clubbable bosses and lazy capital. The public company was never
meant to be a bureaucracy run by distant managers accountable to funds run by computers. The activist
revolt will help give it a new lease of life.”).
223. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM . L. REV. 863 (2013) (noting the roles
of activists in corporate governance).
224. See Groden, supra note 26 (noting some opponents claim that activists’ use of derivatives may
straddle the line of legality). This raises a legitimate question but rather than ban or discourage
activism, an updated disclosure requirement is a preferred approach. Slawotsky, supra note 25
(discussing whether 13(d) should be amended in light of transformations in financial markets).
225. See, e.g., Alan M. Klein, Shareholder Activism in M&A Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (2014), https://corpgov .law.harvard.edu/2014/02/26/shareholderactivism-in-ma-transactions/ (noting the importance of activism in corporate mergers and acquisitions).
226. Joann S. Lublin, In for the Long Haul: More Activist Investors Are Winning Board Seats and
Helping Companies Revamp Their Governance Practices, THE J. REP.: CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 17,
2005), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/NewHomePage/articles/activis tinvesting.htm.
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provide a strong incentive for directors to oversee their companies and for
managers to embrace shareholder value. In commenting on BlackRock
Fink’s anti-activist letter, Carl Icahn noted that “Fink is protecting
underperforming executives with his campaign against activist
investors,”227 stating that ‘“[y]ou can’t get rid of these guys,’ . . . . A lot of
them feel like they can do what they want, because of guys like Larry Fink.
I can’t remember one time that they [BlackRock] voted for us.”228
The almost insurmountable challenges to activists operating in Japan
may be a strong factor contributing to Japan’s lost decades. Japanese
economic performance has been lackluster for over two decades. The
difficulty to engage in activism in Japan has prevented inefficiently run
companies from being transformed into productive businesses and has
prolonged Japan’s economic malaise. Japan provides a sterling exemplar
of why activism should not be banned or curtailed. In contrast, the ability
of activists to engage in activism in United States markets may be a tonic
preventing the managers from continuing to be inefficient and/or exploit
the company.
Therefore, activism does have a role to play in corporate America,
especially when activists employ their influence to ensure lackluster
managers take actions such as amending the governance structure, adding
directors, restructuring the capital base or selling a division or the company
outright. Without the risk to their positions, managers and directors and,
where applicable, other insider interests, can be expected to engage in
various conduct conducive to their own financial self-interest. Activists
can and do prevent or stop such practices within a company. While
detractors of United States activism claim that activism focuses on shortterm profits at the expense of other stakeholders, does a stakeholder system
or a model of governance that does not ascribe overwhelming importance
to shareholder value really deliver superior results? No. Accordingly,
legitimate activism as a virtuous component of corporate governance needs
to be encouraged and incentivized rather than banned or limited.

227. Lublin, supra note 226.
228. Id.

